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We present a tractable model of innovating firms and the aggregate economy that we use to assess
the link between the responses of firms to changes in innovation policy and the impact of those policy
changes on aggregate output and welfare. We argue that the key theoretical determinant of the relative
long-run aggregate impact of alternative policies is their impact on the expected profitability of entering
firms. We show that, to a first-order approximation, a wide range of policy changes have a long-run
aggregate impact in direct proportion to the fiscal expenditures on those policies, and that to evaluate
the aggregate impact of such policy changes, there is no need to calculate changes in firms' decisions
in response to these policy changes. 
We use these results to compare the relative magnitudes of the impact on aggregates in the long run
of three innovation policies in the United States: the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit, federal
expenditure on R&D, and the corporate profits tax. We argue that the corporate profits tax is a relatively
important policy through its negative effects on innovation and physical capital accumulation that
may well undo the benefits of federal support for R&D. We also use a calibrated version of our model
to examine the absolute magnitude of the impact of these policies on aggregates. We show that, depending
on the magnitude of spillovers, it is possible for changes in innovation policies to have a very large
impact on aggregates in the long run. However, over a 15-year horizon, the impact of changes in innovation
policies on aggregate output is not very sensitive to the magnitude of spillovers. 
On the basis of these results we conclude that, while it is possible to make comparisons about the relative
importance of different policies and sharp predictions about their aggregate impact in the medium
term, it is very difficult to shed much light on the implications of innovation policies for long-run aggregate















Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477
and NBER
arielb@econ.ucla.eduI. Introduction
How do changes in economic policies that a⁄ect the costs and bene￿ts to ￿rms of innovative
activity impact aggregate investments in innovation, output, productivity, and welfare? In
this paper, we address this question using a model that focuses on the role of innovative ac-
tivities by heterogeneous ￿rms in contributing to aggregate productivity improvements in the
economy. Our model is rich enough to capture the dynamic decisions of heterogeneous ￿rms
to both improve existing products (process innovation) and create new products (product
innovation), and yet tractable enough to aggregate up from ￿rm-level decisions to obtain a
deeper understanding of how aggregate innovative activities, output, productivity, and wel-
fare should be expected to respond in general equilibrium to changes in innovation policies.
There is a very large empirical literature, following from the work of Zvi Griliches
and many others, that uses detailed ￿rm- and industry-level data to assess the impact of
changes in innovation policies on ￿rms￿decisions to engage in innovative activities.1 At
the same time, there is also a very large macroeconomic literature that aims to assess the
aggregate implications of changes in innovation policy.2 In this paper, we develop a model
that integrates these two perspectives on the implications of innovation policy. As in Atkeson
and Burstein (2010), our model extends Hopenhayn￿ s (1992), Atkeson and Kehoe￿ s (2005),
and Luttmer￿ s (2007) model of ￿rm dynamics with entry of new ￿rms or products to include a
process innovation decision by incumbent ￿rms following Griliches￿(1979) model of knowledge
capital. Our model features both physical capital and intangible capital accumulated by ￿rms,
and spillovers from ￿rms￿innovative activity.3 We view our model as a tractable benchmark
for examining the link between the responses of innovative ￿rms to changes in innovation
policy (modeled as taxes and subsidies on innovative activity) and the impact of those policy
changes on aggregate investments in innovation, output, productivity, and welfare.4
We ￿rst show that one can use a simple two-step algorithm to assess the impact of
1See, e.g., the surveys in Congressional Budget O¢ ce (2005) and Hall, Mairesse, and Mohnen (2010).
2See, e.g., Jones and Manuelli (2005) for a review of the impact of policies on growth in neoclassical
endogenous growth models. See, e.g., Segerstrom (2000), Howitt (2004), and Aghion and Howitt (2006) for
a review of the impact of competition and innovation policy on growth. See, e.g., Kortum (1997) and Jones
and Williams (1998) for work integrating observations on innovation at the ￿rm or industry level into a
macroeconomic framework. Also see, e.g., Lee and Gordon (2005); OECD (2003, 2005), and Congressional
Budget O¢ ce (2005) for reviews of the empirical work on the impact of innovation policy on aggregate
outcomes.
3Our model extends McGrattan and Prescott (2005a,b) by modeling the accumulation of ￿rm-speci￿c
intangible capital. See Klenow and Rodr￿guez-Clare (2005) for a review of spillovers in models of economic
growth.
4In this paper we abstract from policies that change intellectual property rights, such as patents. We will
consider these alternative innovation policies in future work.changes in innovation policies on aggregate innovative activities, output, and productivity in
the long run. In the ￿rst step, one uses a straightforward procedure to measure the impact
of changes in innovation policies on ￿rm pro￿tability. In this step, the analyst only needs
to compute the impact at the margin of a change in innovation policy on the pro￿tability
of a typical ￿rm. There is no need in this ￿rst step for the analyst to take into account,
at least locally, the dynamic response in the innovative activity of the typical ￿rm to the
change in innovation policy. For example, to compute the impact on aggregates in the
long-run of a change in the Tax Credit for Research and Experimentation (R&E), in this
￿rst step, the analyst would simply need to compute the expected impact on the after-tax
pro￿tability of the typical ￿rm of this change in the tax credit, holding ￿xed current levels of
innovation expenditure and other decisions by ￿rms.5 In the second step, the analyst uses the
macroeconomic structure of the model to infer the long-run changes in aggregate innovative
activities, output, and productivity that must accompany, in general equilibrium, the change
in ￿rm pro￿tability computed in the ￿rst step.
We use this algorithm to establish several analytical results on the long-run impact of
changes in innovation policies. We show ￿rst that, globally, a uniform subsidy to innovative
activity has an equivalent impact on aggregates as a direct subsidy to ￿rm pro￿tability be-
cause subsidizing the cost of innovation is equivalent to subsidizing the returns to innovation.
We also provide conditions under which these two policies have the same ￿scal cost. Second,
we show that, locally, changes in the subsidy to any particular type of innovative activity all
have an equivalent impact on aggregates as long as these policy changes have the same impact
on ￿rm pro￿tability. In establishing this second result, we show that in the long run, the
impact of a change in innovation policy on ￿rms￿process innovation decisions must be o⁄set,
in equilibrium, by a change in ￿rms￿product innovation decisions so as to result in the same
aggregate response of output as would be achieved by a uniform subsidy to all innovative
activities. Together, these two results imply that in our model the details of heterogeneous
￿rms￿responses to a particular change in innovation policy are not of ￿rst-order importance
for aggregate outcomes, and that there is no special role for innovation policies distinct from a
policy of subsidizing the pro￿ts of ￿rms directly, even in the presence of spillovers from innov-
ative activities. Third, we provide conditions under which, to a ￿rst-order approximation, the
relative impact of a policy change on ￿rm pro￿tability and on aggregates is proportional to
5In this respect, our procedure di⁄ers from the current standard in the literature that focuses on measuring
the impact of changes in innovative policies on the user cost of R&D and uses ￿rm- or industry-level data to
measure the elasticity of R&D expenditure to changes in this user cost (see, e.g., Mans￿eld 1986; Hall and
Van Reenen 2000; Gri¢ th, Redding, and Van Reenen 2001; and Bloom, Gri¢ th, and Van Reenen 2002).
2the impact of that policy change on government￿ s ￿scal expenditures. These results simplify
policy evaluation because there is no need to calculate changes in e⁄ective marginal tax or
subsidy rates nor changes in ￿rms￿decisions in response to these policy changes to evaluate
their aggregate impact.
We next use our model in two quantitative applications. First, we compare the relative
magnitudes of the impact on aggregates in the long run of three policies a⁄ecting innovative
activity by ￿rms in the United States: the R&E Tax Credit, federal expenditure on R&D,
and the corporate pro￿ts tax.6 We use data on ￿scal expenditures on these policies in the
United States to ￿rst argue that federal expenditure on R&D is much more important than
the R&E Tax Credit in terms of its aggregate impact on the long-run accumulation of both
tangible and intangible capital. We also argue that the corporate pro￿ts tax (which is a
combination of a tax on variable pro￿ts, a subsidy on innovation, and a tax on physical
capital) is a relatively important policy, in comparison to the R&E Tax Credit and federal
expenditure on R&D, in terms of its negative long-run impact on aggregates. To derive this
result, we develop analytical results regarding di⁄erences in the aggregate impact of taxes on
the use of physical capital by ￿rms and of subsidies to innovation.
In our second quantitative application, we use a calibrated version of our model to
examine the absolute magnitude of the impact on aggregates of three policies: a uniform
subsidy to all innovative activities, a subsidy to process innovation, and a subsidy to the use
of physical capital by ￿rms. We choose the size of these policies so that they all lead to ￿scal
expenditures of 3% of GDP. Our model implies that while the response of aggregate invest-
ments in innovation to these policies changes can be pinned down relatively precisely, there is
a great deal of uncertainty regarding the impact of these policy changes on aggregate output
in the long run and on welfare, depending on the magnitude of the spillovers from innovative
activity. For example, in terms of welfare, the equivalent variation in consumption ranges
from between 0 with no spillovers to roughly 50% with strong spillovers. In contrast, we ￿nd
that if we consider the transition over a 15-year horizon, these policy changes have a similar
impact on aggregate investments on innovation and on aggregate output regardless of the
magnitude of spillovers. The large degree of uncertainty about the long-run impact of policy
changes is not apparent at a 15-year horizon because the model￿ s transition dynamics become
extremely slow as the spillovers from innovative activities become large. On the basis of these
results, we conclude that it should be very di¢ cult to use data on the response of aggregate
6See Congressional Budget O¢ ce (2007) for a description of the range of innovation policies in the United
States.
3outcomes to changes in innovation policies over a medium-term horizon to shed much light
on the magnitude of spillovers and hence on the implications of changes in innovation policies
for long-run aggregate output and productivity, and for welfare.
Our model￿ s implications for the impact of changes in innovation policy on long-run
outcomes and welfare do depend on its macroeconomic structure. Our model nests both
semi-endogenous growth and endogenous growth through expanding varieties, as in Romer
(1990) and Acemoglu (2009), chapter 13. In deriving our main results, we assume that the
parameters of our model lie in a region such that an increase in the productivity of incumbent
￿rms in response to a change in policy crowds out the pro￿ts of entering ￿rms. With this
assumption, our model is a semi-endogenous growth model in which innovation policies a⁄ect
the level of aggregate activity but not its growth rate, which is determined by the exogenous
growth rate of general scienti￿c knowledge and the population. There is a knife-edged set
of parameter values for which the pro￿ts of entering ￿rms are independent of other ￿rms￿
productivities. With parameters set in this knife-edge case, our model is an endogenous
growth model in which innovative activity by ￿rms is the engine of growth. Note that the
standard endogenous growth models such as the model of expanding varieties of Romer
(1990), the quality ladders model of Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Klette and Kortum
(2004), and the Schumpeterian models of Aghion and Howitt (1992), as well as many of the
variants of these models discussed in Acemoglu (2009), chapters 13￿ 14, satisfy this knife-
edged property. We ￿nd that the quantitative implications of our model for output at a ￿nite
horizon and for welfare are continuous in the extent to which an increase in the productivity
of incumbent ￿rms in response to a change in policy crowds out the pro￿ts of entering ￿rms.
Hence, we argue that our framework nests fully endogenous growth models for all practical
purposes.
Our baseline model of ￿rm dynamics does not nest quality ladders or Schumpeterian
models of ￿rm dynamics in which entering ￿rms directly displace incumbent ￿rms in the
production of existing products. Our line of argument, however, can be extended to cover
models of this type as well. In particular, in an online appendix, we show that our main
analytic results go through in a Klette and Kortum (2004) type quality ladders version of the
model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the model. Section III charac-
terizes the balanced growth path. Section IV describes optimal innovation policies. Section
V presents analytic results on global policy equivalence and Section VI on the aggregate im-
pact, in the long run, of policy changes. Section VII examines the relative magnitudes of the
4impact of the three policies that a⁄ect innovative activity in the United States. Section VIII
presents the results from our calibrated model. Section IX discusses the use of observations
on the aggregate implications of changes in the research intensity of the economy to infer the
degree of spillovers.
II. The Model
In this section, we describe the physical environment, innovation policies, the equilibrium,
and the implications of our model for ￿rm dynamics.
A. Physical Environment
Time is discrete and labeled t = 0;1;2;.... There are two ￿nal goods, the ￿rst of which we call
the consumption good. The representative household has preferences over this consumption
good, Ct, given by
P1
t=0 ￿
tLt log(Ct=Lt), where Lt is the population at date t, which grows
at a steady rate of gL so Lt+1 = exp(gL)Lt. We assume that ￿ exp(gL) < 1.
Output of the consumption good, Yt, is used for three purposes. First, as consumption
by the representative household. Second, as investment in physical (tangible) capital, Kt+1￿
(1 ￿ ￿k)Kt, where Kt denotes the aggregate capital stock and ￿k denotes the depreciation rate
of physical capital. Third, as an input into innovative activity, Xt. The resource constraint
of the ￿nal consumption good is
Ct + Kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿k)Kt + Xt = Yt: (1)
At each date t, there is a continuum of size Nt of incumbent ￿rms, each producing
distinct intermediate goods. These intermediate goods producing ￿rms are distinguished
by an index z of their current productivity, and we let Jt(z) denote the distribution of z
across incumbent ￿rms at date t (so
R
z dJt(z) = Nt). The consumption good is produced
as a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregate of the output of this continuum of








where yt(z) is the output of an intermediate good producing ￿rm with productivity index z
at date t. We assume that ￿ > 1.
An incumbent intermediate good producing ￿rm with productivity index z produces





where 0 < ￿ < 1. Here, the productivity of the individual ￿rm is given by exp(zt)1=(￿￿1).7 As
we show below, this normalization of productivity is convenient as the equilibrium size of the
￿rm, measured in terms of labor lt(z), capital kt (z), revenues, or variable pro￿ts, is directly
proportional to exp(z).
To innovate, ￿rms must use a second ￿nal good, which we refer to as the research good,
as an input. Intermediate goods producing ￿rms invest in two types of innovation in this
economy: process and product innovation. Incumbent intermediate goods producing ￿rms
engage in process innovation to increase their productivity index z from one period to the
next. For an incumbent ￿rm to increase its productivity index from z in period t to z0 = z+gz
in period t + 1, it requires an expenditure of c(exp(gz))exp(z) units of the research good in
period t, where c(x) is an increasing and convex function.8 We denote the curvature of the
function c(x) by ￿c =
c00(x)x
c0(x) .
Firms invest in product innovation as follows. A new ￿rm producing a new variety
can be created in period t+1 by an expenditure of ne units of the research good in period t.
For simplicity, we assume that all newly created ￿rms start with productivity index ￿ z, which
we normalize to 0.9
Letting Mt ￿ 0 denote the mass of investment in new products in period t, then the




c(exp(gzt(z)))exp(z)dJt(z) = Yrt; (4)
where gzt(z) is the growth rate of the productivity index z chosen by intermediate goods
producing ￿rms with current index z in period t and Yrt is the output of the research good
in period t.
We assume that a fraction ￿f of all incumbent ￿rms and newly created ￿rms exit
7Extending the model to allow for decreasing returns to scale in the production of intermediate goods and
a richer input-output structure (i.e., ￿nal goods and intermediate goods are produced using the consumption
good, capital and labor) leaves our main results unchanged.
8With this speci￿cation of process innovation costs, the cost for a ￿rm of growing by a given percentage
scales in direct proportion to the current size of the ￿rm, which as we show below is proportional to exp(z).
9It is straightforward to allow for exogenous growth in ￿ z so that new goods improve over time. This is the
approach taken in Atkeson and Kehoe (2005).
6exogenously at the beginning of each period. Thus, the evolution of the number of ￿rms is
given by
Nt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿f)(Mt + Nt): (5)
The research good is produced as a Cobb-Douglas combination of the consumption







t , where (6)
Ht+1 = (1 ￿ ￿r)Ht + Yrt. (7)
Here, Lrt and Xt denote the labor and consumption good, respectively, used in the production
of the research good, and At represents the stock of basic scienti￿c knowledge that is assumed
to evolve exogenously, growing at a steady rate of gA so At+1 = exp(gA)At. Increases in this
stock of knowledge improve the productivity of resources devoted to innovative activity. We
interpret A as a worldwide stock of scienti￿c knowledge that is freely available for ￿rms to
use in innovative activities. The determination of A is outside the scope of our analysis.
The variable Ht is the spillover from cumulative innovative activity by ￿rms, here
modeled as an external learning e⁄ect ￿ in innovating, researchers gain knowledge and
experience useful for further innovation that is not captured as part of the private return of
either the ￿rm or the workers engaged in innovation. The parameter ￿r is the rate at which
this external learning e⁄ect depreciates. In what follows, we assume that 0 ￿ ￿ < 1.
The amount of labor used in current production, Lpt, is given by Lpt =
R
z lt(z)dJt(z).
The resource constraint for labor requires that labor used in current production plus labor
used in the production of the research good must sum to a ￿xed total population Lt, that
is, Lpt + Lrt = Lt. Labor is mobile between intermediate goods production and innovation.
The amount of physical capital used in current production must satisfy the constraint Kt =
R
z kt(z)dJt(z).
Finally, the law of motion of the distribution of z across incumbent ￿rms, Jt (z), is
determined by the exogenous exit rate, ￿f, the process innovation decisions of incumbent
￿rms, gzt(z), and the mass of investment in new products, Mt, in a standard manner.
B. Policies and Equilibrium
In this subsection, we describe the decentralization of this economy and de￿ne equilibrium
with a collection of policies. In this decentralization, we assume that the representative
household owns the physical capital stock and rents it to the intermediate good producing
7￿rms at rental rate Rkt. Each period, the household faces a budget constraint given by
Ct + Kt+1 = [Rkt + (1 ￿ ￿k)]Kt + WtLt + Dt ￿ Et,
where Wt, Dt, and Et denote the economy-wide wage, aggregate dividends paid by inter-
mediate good ￿rms, and aggregate ￿scal expenditures on policies (which are ￿nanced by
lump-sum taxes collected from the representative household), respectively. We also de￿ne
an interest rate for bonds denominated in the ￿nal consumption good, ￿ rt, which with log
preferences is given by 1 + ￿ rt = ￿
￿1 (Ct+1=Lt+1)=(Ct=Lt). We ￿nd it useful to denote the
interest rate denominated in terms of the research good as rt. This interest rate is de￿ned by
(1+rt) = (1+￿ rt) Prt
Prt+1. The Euler equation for physical capital is given by 1+￿ rt = Rkt+1+1￿￿k.
Intermediate good producing ￿rms are o⁄ered three types of subsidies and are subject
to one tax. These are abstract policies that are useful in deriving analytical results. In our
quantitative work below we describe a mapping between actual policies and these abstract
policies. The policies are as follows. First, ￿rms receive a subsidy to variable pro￿ts from
production (de￿ned below), which we denote by ￿p. Second, ￿rms receive a subsidy to process
innovation, which we denote by ￿g. Third, ￿rms receive a subsidy to product innovation,
which we denote by ￿e. We refer to the subsidies ￿g and ￿e as innovation policies. We show
below that the subsidy to variable pro￿ts, ￿p, has an equivalent impact to a uniform change
in these innovation policies and hence can also be considered as an innovation policy. Finally,
￿rms are subject to a tax on their use of physical capital, which we denote by ￿k.
As we discuss below, the equilibrium of our model has the standard ine¢ ciency arising
from a monopoly markup in the production of intermediate goods. The policies that we
consider above are not su¢ cient to undo the distortions from this markup. To have enough
policies to implement the socially optimal allocation, we allow for a per-unit subsidy on
production of the consumption good, ￿s, that can be set to undo the distortions from the
markup (note that subsidizing the production of the consumption good is equivalent to
subsidizing the sales of intermediate good producers).
Competitive ￿rms producing the ￿nal consumption good choose inputs and output to
maximize pro￿ts each period subject to (2). By standard arguments, in equilibrium prices




1￿￿, where pt (z) is the price set by ￿rms with
productivity index z, and Pt is the price of the ￿nal good paid by the representative household.
We normalize Pt to 1. This pro￿t maximization problem also gives input demands yt(z) =
(1 + ￿s)
￿ pt(z)￿￿Yt.
8The variable pro￿ts from production of a ￿rm with productivity index z in period t
are given by (1 + ￿p)[pt(z)yt(z) ￿ (1 + ￿k)Rktkt (z) ￿ Wtlt(z)]. This ￿rm chooses price and
quantity, pt (z) and yt (z), to maximize these variable pro￿ts subject to the demand above
and the production function (3). Pro￿t maximization implies that a ￿rm with productivity












and its variable pro￿ts from production can be written as (1 + ￿p)￿t exp(z), with the constant
in variable pro￿ts ￿t de￿ned by
￿t = ￿0 (1 + ￿s)








where ￿0 is a constant.10 As these equations make clear, the variable pro￿ts earned by an
incumbent ￿rm scale with its productivity index z in direct proportion to exp(z).


















The value function Vt(z) corresponds to the expected discounted present value of dividends
paid by an incumbent ￿rm with current productivity index z. The ￿rst term in the right-hand
side of (10) is the current dividend denominated in terms of the research good. It comprises
variable pro￿ts less expenditures on process innovation. Observe that the value function in
this Bellman equation takes the form
Vt(z)
Prt = ￿ Vt exp(z), so that the value of an incumbent
￿rm is directly proportional to the index of the ￿rm￿ s productivity exp(z). We refer to the
factor of proportionality ￿ Vt as the pro￿tability of ￿rms in period t.
The zero-pro￿t condition governing product innovation is given by




as long as there is positive investment in product innovation, and an inequality with the cost
10In particular, ￿0 = ￿￿￿(￿ ￿ 1)￿￿1
h




9of product innovation exceeding the pro￿ts otherwise. The dividend paid by an entering ￿rm,
denominated in terms of the research good, is ￿(1 ￿ ￿e)ne.
To aggregate the decisions of intermediate good producers, we de￿ne an index of total















In parallel to physical capital, we refer to the index of total productivity NtZt as the aggregate
stock of intangible capital in ￿rms. In our applications, we use the sum of expenditures on
consumption, Ct; and investment in physical capital, Kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿k)Kt, as our measure of
aggregate output (GDP) because in the National Income and Product Accounts, expenditures
on innovative activities, PrtYrt, are typically expensed rather than counted as a part of ￿nal
output. Using (1), we have GDPt = Yt ￿ Xt.11
C. Factor Shares, Research Intensity, and the Allocation of Labor
With CES aggregators and Cobb-Douglas production functions, aggregate revenues of in-
termediate goods ￿rms, (1 + ￿s)Yt, are split into three components. A share 1=￿ accrues
to variable pro￿ts from production (exclusive of the subsidy on variable pro￿ts), ￿tNtZt =
1
￿ (1 + ￿s)Yt, a share ￿(￿ ￿ 1)=￿ is paid to physical capital (inclusive of taxes on physical
capital), (1 + ￿k)RktKt =
￿(￿￿1)
￿ (1 + ￿s)Yt, and a share (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)=￿ is paid as wages
to production labor, WtLpt =
(1￿￿)(￿￿1)
￿ (1 + ￿s)Yt.
Production of the research good is undertaken by competitive ￿rms that take the
spillover from innovation Ht as given. Cost minimization in the production of the research











11In using this measure of GDP, we are abstracting from measurement problems arising from the introduc-
tion of new products. Under the assumption that Y from (12) is a physical good that is traded in the market,
these measurement problems for GDP are less likely to arise.
10It also implies
WtLrt = ￿PrtYrt , and Xt = (1 ￿ ￿)PrtYrt : (14)





(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)￿tNtZt
￿PrtYrt
. (15)
We de￿ne the research intensity of the economy, sr, as the ratio of spending on
innovative activities to GDP, srt = PrtYrt=(Yt ￿ Xt). Using (i) Xt = (1 ￿ ￿)PrtYrt, (ii)
Yt=(￿tNtZt) = ￿=(1 + ￿s) together with equation (15), we can express the research intensity




(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)(1 + ￿s)
Lpt
Lrt
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿1
. (16)
An equilibrium in this economy is a collection of sequences of aggregate prices f￿ rt;Prt,
Rkt,Wtg, prices for intermediate goods fpt(z)g, sequences of aggregate quantities fYt;Kt;Xt,
Ct;Lpt;Lrt;Htg, quantities of the intermediate goods and allocations of physical capital and
labor fyt(z);kt (z);lt(z)g, sequences of f￿tg, and sequences of ￿rm value functions and
process innovation decisions fVt(z);gzt (z)g together with distributions of ￿rms, mass of in-
cumbent ￿rms, measures of product innovation, and aggregate productivities fJt(z);Nt;Mt;Ztg
such that, given a set of policies f￿p;￿e;￿g;￿k;￿sg; initial stocks fA0;L0;H0;K0g, and an
initial distribution of ￿rms J0(z), households maximize their utility subject to their budget
constraint, intermediate good ￿rms maximize pro￿ts, all of the feasibility constraints are
satis￿ed, and the distribution of ￿rms evolves as described above.
D. Firm Pro￿tability and Firm Dynamics
Our model has two main implications for ￿rm dynamics that we use frequently in our results
below. First, the growth rate of incumbent ￿rms is independent of ￿rm size and is determined
by what we term the level of ￿rm pro￿tability. Second, in any period with positive product
innovation, the level of ￿rm pro￿tability is determined by the cost of product innovation.
Putting these two implications together, we get a simple formula for determining how changes
in innovation policy impact process innovation by incumbent ￿rms.
To derive the two implications regarding ￿rm dynamics, observe from (10) that all






This result implies that the growth rate of incumbent ￿rms in our model, gzt, is always
independent of ￿rm size. With this result, we can write the law of motion for the index of
total productivity as
Nt+1Zt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿f)exp(gzt)NtZt + (1 ￿ ￿f)Mt exp(￿ z). (18)
Combining the two expressions governing process and product innovation, (11) and
(17), we get that in any period in which there is positive product innovation, the growth rate
gz of incumbent ￿rms (the level of process innovation) is simply determined by
(1 ￿ ￿g)c
0 (exp(gzt)) = (1 ￿ ￿e)ne. (19)
To ensure the existence of equilibrium, we need parameter restrictions to ensure that
pro￿tability for incumbent ￿rms ￿ V is well de￿ned (￿nite) and that the index of average
productivity, Z, is also well de￿ned. Both of these conditions are restrictions on the growth
rate of incumbent ￿rms, gzt. We present these restrictions in the next section for the case
in which the economy is on a balanced growth path with positive product innovation every
period.
III. Balanced Growth Path with Product Innovation
In our results on the aggregate implications of policy changes in the long run, we analyze the
change in our economy￿ s balanced growth path corresponding to a given change in policy.
We now characterize a balanced growth path (BGP) with product innovation in our model
economy. On a BGP with product innovation, a subset of the variables is constant over time
and other variables grow at a constant rate. In particular, on a BGP, the allocation of labor
between production and innovation remains constant as does the pro￿tability of ￿rms in
terms of the research good, the interest rate in terms of both the ￿nal good and the research
good, the rental rate of capital, and the index of average productivity of incumbent ￿rms.
Output of the consumption and research goods, consumption, the stock of physical capital,
total productivity, wages, and cumulated experience with innovation all grow at constant
rates.
12Our model has two types of BGPs with product innovation, one with semi-endogenous
growth and one with endogenous growth, depending on parameter values. Speci￿cally, we
de￿ne a parameter ￿ as a function of the parameters ￿;￿, ￿, and ￿:
￿ = 1 ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
: (20)
Our model is a semi-endogenous growth model with the growth rate along the BGP deter-
mined by the exogenous growth rates of scienti￿c knowledge gA and of the population gL if
￿ > 0. In this case, it is not possible to have fully endogenous growth because an increase
in the index of total productivity NZ results in general equilibrium in a decline in the prof-
itability of ￿rms, and thus a decline of ￿rms￿investments in innovative activity. Growth
can occur only to the extent that scienti￿c progress reduces the cost of innovation and/or
growth in population increases market size. We focus on equilibria that satisfy this parameter
restriction in deriving our main results.
Our model is an endogenous growth model with the growth rate along the BGP de-
termined by ￿rms￿investments in innovative activity only in the knife-edged case in which
￿ = 0. In this case, it is possible to have endogenous growth because an increase in the
index of total productivity NZ has no impact on the pro￿tability of ￿rms and thus ￿rms ￿nd
it optimal to continue to invest in innovation even as the productivity of their competitors
grows. To the best of our knowledge, all endogenous growth models with innovation by ￿rms
satisfy some version of this knife-edge parameter restriction.12
We now characterize a BGP with product innovation and semi-endogenous growth.
We provide additional details of this characterization in the appendix.
A BGP with Product Innovation and Semi-endogenous Growth. When ￿ > 0,
the conditions characterizing a BGP have a block recursive structure that lies at the heart
of our analytic results. We ￿rst characterize aggregate growth rates, the interest rate, and
the rental rate of capital along a BGP with product innovation. Along such a BGP, these
variables are independent of policies. We then characterize the growth rate of incumbent
￿rms, the average productivity of ￿rms, and the equilibrium level of ￿rm pro￿tability from
the zero-pro￿t condition for product innovation. Finally, we solve for the levels along the BGP
12If ￿ < 0, then our model does not have a BGP, as in this case the pro￿tability of ￿rms and their
investments in innovation accelerate as the index of total productivity NZ grows. Our knife-edge condition
is di⁄erent from the one emphasized in Jones (1999) on the technology governing innovation. Our condition
encompasses both the technology governing innovation and spillovers, as well as the impact of product market
competition on the pro￿tability of creating new products.
13of the other aggregate variables consistent with the equilibrium level of ￿rm pro￿tability.
The growth rates and the interest rate are determined from equations (1), (4), (6),





(gA + gL), (21)
and the growth rate of total productivity (NZ) is equal to the growth of the measure of
incumbent ￿rms, gN, with Z constant. The growth rate of output of the consumption good
(and hence consumption, physical capital, and the input into innovative activity X) is given
by gY = gN=[(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)]+gL, the growth rate of output of the research good is given by
gY r = gN, the growth rate of the wage is gY ￿ gL, the rental rate of capital is constant and
given by Rk = ￿
￿1 exp(gY ￿ gL)￿1+￿k, and the interest rate in terms of the research good
is given by r = ￿
￿1 exp(gN ￿ gL) ￿ 1.
The growth rate of incumbent ￿rms, gz, is constant and, with positive product inno-
vation, is determined as the solution to (19). Average productivity is given by
Z =
exp(gN) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿f)
exp(gN) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿f)exp(gz)
. (22)
The equilibrium level of ￿rm pro￿tability ￿ V is solved from the zero pro￿t condition for product
innovation, (11). The constant in ￿rm pro￿ts, ￿=Pr, is determined from
￿ V =
1 + r





￿ (1 ￿ ￿g)c(exp(gz))
￿
: (23)
We solve for aggregates along the BGP as follows. The allocation of labor between











and labor market clearing, Lpt + Lrt = Lt. For a given level of the stock of basic scienti￿c
knowledge At, we solve for the mass of ￿rms Nt from
￿
Pr
= ￿1 (1 + ￿s)
1￿￿






1￿￿ Lpt , (25)
where ￿1 is a constant. Finally, we solve for aggregate output, Yt; using (12), the stock
14of physical capital, Kt; using the factor shares of physical capital and production-labor,
the consumption good used in the production of the research good, Xt; using (14), and
consumption, Ct; using (1).
There are two ways to see why the restriction that ￿ > 0 ensures that the BGP of our
model features semi-endogenous growth. The ￿rst is mechanically from equation (21): when
￿ > 0 (and ￿ < 1), the growth rates are necessarily pinned down by resource constraints and
production functions. The second is to see from equation (25) that ￿ > 0 is required to obtain
a unique solution for the total productivity of ￿rms NtZt, for given levels of Lt and At, once
￿=Pr is determined by (23). The parameter ￿ determines to what extent an increase in total
productivity NZ crowds out ￿rm pro￿tability, taking into account all the general equilibrium
e⁄ects on aggregate prices and quantities. In contrast, when ￿ = 0, the general equilibrium
e⁄ects exactly cancel and the crowding-out e⁄ect is not operative. In this case, it is possible
to have a BGP with fully endogenous growth driven by ￿rms￿innovative activity.
IV. Optimal Innovation Policies
We now characterize optimal policy on the BGP with product innovation in the semi-
endogenous growth case of our model. The equilibrium of our model has two ine¢ ciencies.
The ￿rst is the standard ine¢ ciency arising from a monopoly markup in the production of
intermediate goods that distorts the mix of labor and consumption goods used in the produc-
tion of the research good (when ￿ < 1) and the ratio of physical capital to labor used in the
production of intermediate goods (when ￿ > 0). The second ine¢ ciency arises because agents
do not internalize the spillover from experience in innovative activities (when ￿ > 0). Hence,
the equilibrium level of innovative activity is too low. A planner can undo these distortions
with a subsidy to production of the consumption good and a uniform subsidy to process and
product innovation (￿g = ￿e).
Proposition 1: If the social optimum allocation has a BGP with product innovation
and semi-endogenous growth, then that optimal BGP corresponds to the equilibrium BGP











e = 1 ￿ ￿
￿ exp(gL)[exp(gN) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿r)]
[exp(gN) ￿ ￿ exp(gL)(1 ￿ ￿r)]
, (26)
15where gN is given by (21). The other policies are set to zero.
Proof: See Appendix.
Clearly, the extent of the optimal innovation subsidy depends on the spillover parameter
￿. To verify that the social optimum has product innovation, one simply must check the
conditions for a BGP with product innovation described in the Appendix. With endogenous
growth, Proposition 1 applies, except that the socially optimal growth rate of production of
the research good gN must be solved for endogenously, as described in the Appendix.
V. Global Policy Equivalence
In this section we show that a uniform subsidy to all innovative activity, ￿g = ￿e, has an
equivalent impact on equilibrium allocations as a direct subsidy to ￿rms￿variable pro￿ts in the
sense that the equilibrium allocations remain constant as long as the ratio (1 + ￿p)=(1 ￿ ￿g)
remains constant. We also provide conditions under which these two policies have the same
￿scal impact. Through these results, we argue that in our model there is no special role for
innovation policies distinct from a policy of subsidizing the variable pro￿ts of ￿rms, even in
the presence of spillovers from innovative activities.
Proposition 2: Let f￿p;￿g;￿e;￿k;￿sg be a set of policies that are constant over time
with ￿g = ￿e, and let there be an equilibrium allocation with product innovation every period
corresponding to these policies. Let fe ￿p;e ￿g;e ￿e;e ￿k;e ￿sg be a set of alternative policies with




1￿￿g. Then the equilibrium allocations corresponding
to these two sets of policies are equal.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is straightforward from inspection of three equilibrium
conditions: (10), (11), and (19). A uniform subsidy to process and product innovation is
equivalent to changing the equilibrium price of the research good. Since variable pro￿ts are
the returns to innovative activities, a subsidy to these pro￿ts is a subsidy to the returns to
innovation. One can achieve the same aggregate results by subsidizing the returns to or the
costs of innovative activity.13
We now compare the ￿scal cost of these alternative policies on a balanced growth path.
13Note that the assumption that the spillovers from innovative activity impact equally the cost of both
process and product innovation (without favoring either type of innovative activity) is important in deriving
this result on the equivalence between innovation subsidies and subsidies to ￿rm pro￿ts, as well as the result
on the local equivalence of changes in the subsidy to any particular type of innovative activity that we present
in the following section.
16Aggregate ￿scal expenditures on policies at any point in time are given by
E = ￿p￿NZ + ￿gPrc(exp(gz))NZ + ￿ePrneM ￿ ￿kRkK + ￿sY . (27)
To compare the ￿scal cost of the two policies, note that on a BGP, the free-entry condition
(11) can be rewritten using (23), and M=(NZ) = [exp(gN) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿f)exp(gz)]=(1 ￿ ￿f) as





1 ￿ ￿ exp(gL)(1 ￿ ￿f)exp(gz ￿ gN)
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿f)exp(gz ￿ gN)
￿ 1. (29)
Since the result in Proposition 2 implies that the two policy alternatives implement the same
allocations on a BGP, equation (28) implies that
E ￿ ~ E = (~ ￿e ￿ ￿e)PrneM (￿ ￿ 1), (30)
where ~ E denotes ￿scal expenditures under the alternative policies.
To understand expression (30), note that equation (28) and Proposition 2 imply that
the discounted expected value of subsidies o⁄ered to an entering ￿rm are the same under the
two policy alternatives. The ￿scal impact of the two policy alternatives di⁄ers to the extent
that the timing of the subsidies o⁄ered to an entering ￿rm di⁄ers. In particular, subsidies
to product innovation are paid up front, whereas subsidies to variable pro￿ts and process
innovation are paid at later dates. The variable ￿ re￿ ects the impact of discounting on the
calculation of ￿scal impact of these subsidies.
The parameter ￿ de￿ned in expression (29) is related to observables on the BGP as
follows. Note ￿rst that if ￿ exp(gL) = 1, then ￿ = 1. In our model, ￿ exp(gL) is equal
to the ratio of the growth of aggregate GDP to the consumption interest rate, ￿ exp(gL)
= exp(gY)=(1 + ￿ r). Thus, ￿ = 1 if the growth rate of aggregate GDP equals the consumption
interest rate. Since we require that the consumption interest rate be at least as large as the
growth of aggregate GDP, we have ￿ ￿ 1: Second, from equation (18) in the BGP, the term
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿f)exp(gz ￿ gN) in expression (29) is equal to the share of production employment
accounted for by new products. We use these two observations in our calibration below to
argue that ￿ = 1:16 in the United States.
Thus, to summarize, we have that the ￿scal cost of a uniform subsidy to innovative
17activities is slightly lower than the ￿scal cost of a subsidy to variable pro￿ts that implements
the same allocation when the interest rate exceeds the growth rate of the economy because
the portion of the innovation subsidy that is paid as a subsidy to product innovation is paid
up front to entering ￿rms.
Note that in Proposition 2, we impose that policies are constant over time. Thus,
we do not consider subsidies that are o⁄ered to incumbent ￿rms but are not o⁄ered in the
future to entering ￿rms. That is, for the set of policies that we consider here, entering ￿rms
anticipate that they will receive the same subsidies in the future as the current incumbents.
As we discuss in greater detail in the next section, it is the impact of policy on the incentives
of ￿rms to enter that is critical for their aggregate e⁄ects.
VI. Calculating Aggregate E⁄ects of Changes in Policies
In this section we present a two-step algorithm for computing the implications for the change
in aggregates from one BGP to another resulting from a change in policies in the case that our
model has a BGP with semi-endogenous growth and positive product innovation. We ￿rst
use this algorithm to derive analytical results on the e⁄ects of changes in innovation policies.
We derive conditions under which the long-run impact of changes in innovation policies is, to
a ￿rst-order approximation, directly proportional to the ￿scal impact of those policy changes.
Hence, under these conditions, the relative magnitudes of the impact of di⁄erent innovation
policy changes can be measured simply from the relative magnitudes of the ￿scal impact of
these policy changes. We then analyze the impact of changes in the tax on physical capital
and compare these results with those that we have obtained for innovation policies. In the
Appendix, we brie￿ y discuss how to extend our algorithm in the case where our model has a
BGP with endogenous growth.
Our algorithm takes advantage of the block recursive structure of the equations char-
acterizing a BGP in our model with semi-endogenous growth and positive product innovation.
When our model has semi-endogenous growth, aggregate growth rates and the interest rate
in the BGP are invariant to policy changes and are as described in Section III above.
In the ￿rst step of our algorithm, we solve for the equilibrium level of ￿rm pro￿tability,
￿ V , the growth rate of incumbent ￿rms, gz, the level of average productivity, Z, and the
constant in ￿rm pro￿ts, ￿=Pr, from (11), (19), (22), and (23). In the second step, we solve
for the allocation of labor between production and research from (24) and labor market
clearing, and for the mass of ￿rms Nt from (25). All other aggregates in a BGP are pinned
down by these variables. We now use this algorithm to establish two propositions on the
aggregate impact of a change in innovation policies on BGP allocations.
18A. Changes in Subsidy to Variable Pro￿ts
In the following proposition, we consider the aggregate impact of changes in the subsidy to
variable pro￿ts.
Proposition 3: If our model has a BGP with semi-endogenous growth and positive
product innovation, then a change in the subsidy to variable pro￿ts of size ￿log(1 + ￿p)
results in the following changes to the aggregates along the BGP:
1. The equilibrium level of ￿rm pro￿tability, ￿ V , the growth rate of incumbent ￿rms, gz,
and average productivity, Z, are unchanged;
2. The constant in ￿rm pro￿ts, ￿=Pr, changes by ￿log(￿=Pr) = ￿￿log(1 + ￿p);
3. The aggregate allocation of labor between production and research changes by ￿log(Lp=Lr) =
￿￿log(1 + ￿p);




L ￿log(1 + ￿p);













￿log(1 + ￿p) ;
6. To a ￿rst-order approximation, the change in the research intensity of the economy, sr,
is ￿logsr = Y
GDP￿log(1 + ￿p).
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 3 is the simplest application of our two-step algorithm for computing
the aggregate implications of changes in innovation policies, and it illustrates the logic of
the algorithm in a straightforward manner. We start in result 1 with the observation that
the equilibrium level of ￿rm pro￿tability ￿ V must remain constant in response to a change
in the subsidy to variable pro￿ts to satisfy the equilibrium condition that there be zero
pro￿ts associated with product innovation. In result 2, we see that to keep the level of ￿rm
pro￿tability constant, the constant in variable pro￿ts, ￿=Pr; must change to o⁄set the direct
impact of the subsidy to variable pro￿ts on ￿rm pro￿tability. This point follows immediately
because a subsidy to variable pro￿ts has no impact on the level of process innovation, gz,
or on the average productivity of ￿rms, Z: In terms of ￿rm dynamics, the only impact of
a subsidy to variable pro￿ts is to encourage product innovation. Because the subsidy to
variable pro￿ts has no impact on the life cycle of a typical ￿rm, the use of the research good
for innovative activities per ￿rm is unchanged. This observation is the key to our calculation
of the aggregate reallocation of labor between production and research in result 3.
19The resulting response of total productivity NZ then follows from the downward-
sloping relationship between total productivity and the constant in variable pro￿ts that fol-
lows from our assumption that this is a semi-endogenous growth model. The response of
total productivity to changes in innovation policy in this case is self-limiting because, as we
have discussed above, an increase in the total productivity of incumbent ￿rms crowds out
the pro￿tability of new ￿rms and hence crowds out product innovation. As is evident in the
expression in result 4, the slope of this relationship depends inversely on ￿, which measures
the extent to which an increase in the productivity of all ￿rms crowds out the pro￿tability
of a given ￿rm. If ￿ is large, so that the crowding out is strong, then the response of total
productivity associated with a given change in ￿=Pr is small. In this case, the response
of innovative activity to a change in policy is crowded out before a large response of total
productivity can occur. In contrast, as ￿ approaches zero, this crowding-out e⁄ect is weak
and the corresponding response of total productivity becomes large. The remaining aggre-
gates follow immediately from the responses of the aggregate allocation of labor and total
productivity.
B. Changes in Subsidies to Process or Product Innovation
In the next proposition, we consider the aggregate impact of changes in subsidies to process
and/or product innovation individually. In this case, changes in policies do a⁄ect the level
of process innovation and the average productivity of ￿rms, as well as the level of product
innovation.
Proposition 4: If our model has a BGP with semi-endogenous growth and positive
product innovation, and policies are initially set so that ￿g = ￿e, then a change in the
subsidy to process innovation of size ￿log(1 ￿ ￿g) and/or a change in the subsidy to product
innovation of size ￿log(1 ￿ ￿e) results in the following changes to the aggregates along the
BGP:
1. The equilibrium level of ￿rm pro￿tability, ￿ V , changes by ￿log ￿ V = ￿log(1 ￿ ￿e);
2. To a ￿rst-order approximation, the growth rate of incumbent ￿rms, gz, and average




[￿log(1 ￿ ￿e) ￿ ￿log(1 ￿ ￿g)]
￿logZ =
(1 ￿ ￿f)exp(gz)
exp(gN) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿f)exp(gz)
1
￿c
[￿log(1 ￿ ￿e) ￿ ￿log(1 ￿ ￿g)];
203. To a ￿rst-order approximation, the constant in ￿rm pro￿ts, ￿=Pr, the aggregate al-
location of labor between production and research, Lp=Lr, the index of total produc-
tivity, NZ, aggregate output, GDP, and the research intensity of the economy, sr,
change as in Proposition 3 with ￿[sg￿log(1 ￿ ￿g) + (1 ￿ sg)￿log(1 ￿ ￿e)] replacing





The application of our algorithm here in Proposition 4 to the case of changes to the
individual subsidies to process and product innovation one at a time or in combination applies
only to a ￿rst approximation because now ￿rm dynamics, characterized by ￿rms￿investments
in process innovation gz and average productivity Z; do change in response to the change in
subsidies. In fact, in response to a change in innovation policy (in terms of a change in the
subsidy to either process or product innovation), incumbent ￿rms in our model can exhibit
a wide range of di⁄erent responses of their investments in process innovation depending on
the curvature of the process innovation cost function given by ￿c.
Two key insights are needed to establish that, to a ￿rst approximation, this response in
incumbent ￿rms￿investments in process innovation does not matter for the aggregates. The
￿rst insight is that, to a ￿rst-order approximation, the change in the constant in ￿rm pro￿ts
￿=Pr required to maintain zero pro￿ts to product innovation does not depend on the induced
response of ￿rms￿process innovation gz. This ￿rst insight follows directly from the envelope
condition in ￿rms￿Bellman equation de￿ning ￿rm pro￿tability ￿ V : since ￿rms are choosing
process innovation optimally in the original allocation, to a ￿rst-order approximation the
change in ￿rm pro￿tability induced by a change in process innovation is zero. The second
insight is that to a ￿rst-order approximation, the aggregate reallocation of labor between
production and research also does not depend on the response of ￿rms￿investments in process
innovation. This second insight is more subtle and depends both on the assumption that in
the original allocation the subsidies to both types of innovation are equal (￿e = ￿g) and on
the result that all ￿rms choose the same process innovation rate gz: With these additional
equalities, we have that, to a ￿rst-order approximation, the use of the research good for
innovative activities per ￿rm is again unchanged, and hence the aggregate reallocation of
labor is the same as in Proposition 3.
Finally, consider the response of the index of total productivity NZ to the change in
policy. Here, with a change in the subsidy to process or product innovation separately, as
noted in point 2, ￿rms￿investments in process innovation gz change and the resulting level
21of the average productivity of ￿rms Z also changes. The size of these responses depends
on the curvature of ￿rms￿process innovation cost function ￿c: If this cost function has low
curvature, the response of process innovation and average productivity can be quite large.
In equilibrium, however, it is the crowding-out e⁄ect of an increase in total, not average,
productivity on ￿rm pro￿ts that determines the aggregate response of the economy. It is
irrelevant for aggregates whether this response of total productivity is achieved through a
large increase in average productivity due to a large increase in process innovation and a
small change in product innovation or through a small change in average productivity and
a large change in product innovation. If the average productivity of incumbent ￿rms rises
substantially in response to a change in policy, then the crowding-out e⁄ect implies that there
is less room for the creation of new products.
In the Appendix we present a corollary of Proposition 4 which establishes that, to
a ￿rst-order approximation, a change in the subsidy to process or product innovation indi-
vidually has the same aggregate impact on the index of total productivity and output as
a change in the subsidy to variable pro￿ts as long as these policy changes have the same
impact on ￿rm pro￿tability holding ￿xed ￿rms￿process innovation decisions. This corollary
reinforces the point that, to a ￿rst-order approximation, information on the response of ￿rms￿
investments in process innovation to a change in innovation policy is not informative for the
aggregate implications of that policy change: what is needed to evaluate policy, at least lo-
cally, is information on the impact of that policy change on the constant in ￿rm variable
pro￿ts holding ￿xed ￿rms￿decisions to invest in process innovation. As we have seen in
Proposition 4, changes in the individual subsidies to process or product innovation do a⁄ect
￿rms￿process innovation decisions. In contrast, as we have seen in Proposition 3, changes in
the subsidy to ￿rms￿variable pro￿ts have no e⁄ect on ￿rms￿process innovation decisions and
hence no impact on average productivity. As this corollary establishes, despite this contrast,
to a ￿rst-order approximation, these policy changes have the same impact on aggregates as
long as they have the same impact on ￿rm pro￿tability holding ￿xed ￿rms￿process innovation
decisions.
Note that the long-run change in aggregate consumption, C, corresponding to a change
in these policies that leads to a given change in ￿=Pr is the same in Proposition 3 and
Proposition 4 and its corollary. This result follows from the fact that the change in the ratio
of investment in physical capital to GDP is the same across all of these policies.
C. Using Fiscal Impact to Compare Aggregate E⁄ects of Innovation Policy Changes
In Propositions 3 and 4 we computed the aggregate impact of a given change in the loga-
22rithm of innovation subsidies. To use these results in applications, one would have to measure
changes in e⁄ective marginal subsidy rates. In applying our algorithm to measure the ag-
gregate impact of policies in the data, we ￿nd it more convenient to compute the aggregate
impact of a change in subsidies measured in terms of the change in aggregate ￿scal expendi-
tures on these policies. We do this in the next proposition.
Proposition 5: Let our model have a BGP with semi-endogenous growth and posi-
tive product innovation, and suppose policies are initially set so that ￿p = ￿g = ￿e = 0.
Suppose that these policies change by ￿￿p, ￿￿g, ￿￿e, and ￿￿s = 0. Then, to a ￿rst-order
approximation, the log change in the constant in ￿rm pro￿ts, ￿=Pr, is given by
￿log(￿=Pr) = ￿[￿￿p + sg￿￿g + (1 ￿ sg)￿￿e] , (31)
and the change in aggregate expenditures on subsidies E is given by
￿E = ￿NZ
￿






where ￿ is de￿ned in expression (29).
Proof: See Appendix.
Recall from Propositions 3 and 4 that, to a ￿rst-order approximation, changes in the
aggregate allocation of labor between production and research, Lp=Lr, aggregate output,
GDP, and the research intensity of the economy, sr, are all proportional to the negative of
the log change in the constant in variable pro￿ts, ￿=Pr. Hence, what Proposition 5 implies is
that if we start from a situation with no policies (but for ￿s and ￿k), a change in the subsidy to
variable pro￿ts and a change in the subsidy to process innovation all have aggregate impacts
that are directly proportional to their aggregate ￿scal impact. In contrast, a change in the
subsidy to product innovation has an aggregate impact that is directly proportional to ￿
times its impact on expenditures in this subsidy. The intuition for this adjustment by ￿ is the
same as that discussed in Section V. When the interest rate is equal to the growth rate of the
economy, ￿ = 1, the aggregate impact of all of these policy changes is directly proportional
to the ￿scal impact of these changes.
Summarizing these results, we have that for changes in ￿p and ￿g, the log change in


















23and for changes in ￿e, the log change in GDP per dollar change in ￿scal expenditures is ￿
times the ratio in the equation above.
D. Changes in Tax on Use of Physical Capital
In the next proposition we characterize the aggregate impact of a change in the tax ￿k on the
￿rms￿use of physical capital. A change in this tax has new e⁄ects that arise from the impact
of this tax on intermediate goods ￿rms￿physical capital to output ratio and also because
changes in this tax do not alter the allocation of labor between production and research.
Proposition 6: If our model has a BGP with semi-endogenous growth and positive
product innovation, then a change in the tax to the use of physical capital of size ￿log(1 + ￿k)
results in the following changes to the aggregates along the BGP:
1. The equilibrium level of ￿rm pro￿tability, ￿ V , the constant in ￿rm pro￿ts, ￿=Pr, the
growth rate of incumbent ￿rms, gz, and average productivity, Z, are unchanged;
2. The aggregate allocation of labor between production and research, Lp=Lr, and the
research intensity of the economy, sr, are unchanged;








To understand the di⁄erent aggregate implications of the policies considered in Propo-
sitions 3, 4, and 6, it is helpful to compare the impact of these policies on the innovation
intensity of the economy sr (the ratio of intangible investment to output) and on the ratio of
physical capital investment to output of the ￿nal consumption good (which is proportional
to K=Y ). The innovation policies that we considered in Propositions 3 and 4 a⁄ect sr but do
not a⁄ect K=Y . In contrast, the policy that we considered in Proposition 6, i.e., a change
in the tax on the use of physical capital, a⁄ects K=Y but does not a⁄ect sr. Note that a
change in the tax on the use of physical capital has an additional direct e⁄ect of changing
the allocation of aggregate output between consumption and investment in physical capital.
This e⁄ect is a standard implication of taxing physical capital.
We can use Proposition 6 to derive a relationship between the change in GDP and the
change in ￿scal expenditures from changes in the tax on the use of physical capital. Under








(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)￿
. (34)
Comparing (33) and (34), we see that the change in GDP relative to the change in ￿scal
expenditure from changes in the tax on physical capital can, in general, be higher or lower
than that from changes in innovation policies. Hence, one cannot use the relative magnitudes
of aggregate impact of these policy changes without specifying a full set of model parameters.
VII. Applying Our Algorithm
To this point, we have considered abstract policies. In this section we apply the results in
Section VI to assess the relative magnitudes of the impact on aggregates of three current
policies a⁄ecting innovation activity by ￿rms in the United States: the Research and Experi-
mentation (R&E) Tax Credit, federal spending on research and development (R&D), and the
corporate pro￿ts tax. As we discuss in greater detail below, we model changes in all three of
these policies as combinations of changes in our abstract policies.
We consider the aggregate impact of eliminating each of these three policies in turn.
To measure the relative impact of these policies on aggregates, we use the logic of our results
in Proposition 5 that, to a ￿rst-order approximation, the relative magnitudes of the aggregate
e⁄ects of two di⁄erent changes in innovations policy are given by the relative magnitudes of
the impact of those policy changes on ￿scal expenditures, holding all ￿rms￿decisions ￿xed.
In the statement of Proposition 5, we assumed that policies were set initially equal to
zero for calculating the impact of a policy change on ￿scal expenditure. In our application,
we use a related ￿rst-order approximation in which we consider the aggregate impact of
eliminating a subsidy that is initially set at a value di⁄erent from zero. According to this
approximation, the aggregate impact of eliminating a policy is also given by (33), where
￿E now denotes current expenditure on the policy being eliminated. The details of this
approximation are given in the Appendix.
To compare the relative size of the impact of these three policies on aggregates in the
United States, we use data from 2007 to measure ￿scal expenditures on these three policies.
According to the O¢ ce of Management and Budget (2009), the ￿scal expenditure on the
Research and Experimentation Tax Credit in 2007 was $10 billion. The same data source
lists federal spending on R&D of $139 billion.14 Finally, the National Income and Product
14Federal spending on R&D is often grouped into ￿ve categories: basic research, applied research, develop-
ment, R&D equipment, and R&D facilities (see, e.g., O¢ ce of Management and Budget 2009). Over 50% of
federal spending on basic research is in Health and Human Services. The three leading agencies in applied
25Accounts (Table 6.18) shows revenue of $445 billion from corporate pro￿ts taxes.
We now describe in greater detail how we map the R&E Tax Credit, federal spending
on R&D, and the corporate pro￿ts tax into our framework. We model the R&E Tax Credit
as a combination of subsidies to process and product innovation of sizes ￿re
g and ￿re
e , where
the precise size of these subsidies depends on the details of the rules on eligibility for the tax
credit.15 We abstract from these complications of the policy because, as we have shown in
our model, all that we need to calculate the relative magnitude of these policies on aggregate
in the BGP is the aggregate ￿scal impact of the R&E Tax Credit. According to our model, in
the end the R&E Tax Credit is simply a complicated and perhaps administratively expensive
way of subsidizing ￿rms￿variable pro￿ts.
We model federal spending on R&D as a direct subsidy to the production of the




Finally, we model the corporate pro￿ts tax as a combination of taxes on variable pro￿ts
and physical capital, and subsidies to innovative activities. The corporate pro￿ts tax includes
a tax on variable pro￿ts simply because variable pro￿ts are a part of corporate pro￿ts. As
is standard, the corporate pro￿ts tax includes a tax on the use of physical capital (relative
to the use of other inputs such as labor) depending on the extent to which this capital is
equity ￿nanced (as opposed to debt ￿nanced or leased), and the extent of the deductibility
of depreciation of physical capital (both of these factors a⁄ect the extent to which spending
on physical capital by ￿rms is deductible from corporate pro￿ts). The corporate pro￿ts tax
includes a subsidy to process innovation by incumbent ￿rms if these ￿rms partly expense
this innovative activity so that they are deducted from corporate pro￿ts. To the extent that
expenditures on product innovation can also be partly expensed, the corporate pro￿ts tax
can also include a subsidy to product innovation.16
To the extent that elimination of any of these three policies amounts to a change in
research are Health and Human Services, Defense, and Energy. The Defense Department and NASA account
for the overwhelming majority of spending on development. Expenditures on equipment and facilities are
spread across a variety of agencies. Spending in 2007 was allocated among $28 billion on basic research,
$27 billion on applied research, $80 billion on development, and $4 billion on equipment and facilities. For
comparison, business spending on R&D in 2007 was measured at $260 billion.
15In practice, the R&E Tax Credit in the United States is a complicated policy that de￿nes quali￿ed
research expenses and o⁄ers a credit only for those expenses that are incremental over a baseline amount that
is also de￿ned in the regulations (see, e.g., Hall 2001).
16Gentry and Hubbard (2000), Cullen and Gordon (2007), and McGrattan and Prescott (2005a) discuss
incomplete o⁄sets of investment in intangible capital against corporate pro￿ts. Empirical work by Gentry
and Hubbard (2000), Lee and Gordon (2005), Cullen and Gordon (2007), and Djankov et al. (2010) ￿nd that
corporate taxes reduce entry of new ￿rms.
26the overall subsidy to variable pro￿ts, ￿p, or to a change in the overall subsidy to process
innovation, ￿g, then from Proposition 5, the relative aggregate impact, to a ￿rst-order ap-
proximation, of eliminating these policies can be measured directly from their relative ￿scal
expenditures (as currently measured) ￿ no parameters of the model enter into this calcula-
tion.
To the extent that elimination of any of these policies amounts to a change in the
overall subsidy to product innovation, ￿e, the relative aggregate impact, to a ￿rst-order
approximation, of eliminating these policies can be measured from the ￿scal expenditure of
the component of the policy a⁄ecting the subsidy to product innovation, scaled up by the
parameter ￿ re￿ ecting the di⁄erence in the discounted present value and cross section of
￿rm dividends. For example, in the case of the R&E Tax Credit, one needs to scale up ￿scal
expenditure on that portion of the tax credit that is paid for the development of new products
or ￿rms. In the case of the corporate pro￿ts tax, one needs to scale up ￿scal expenditure
arising from the expensing of product innovation costs.17
We now discuss how we calibrate the parameter ￿ de￿ned in expression (29). We set the
ratio of the growth of aggregate GDP to the consumption interest rate, exp(gY)=(1 + ￿ r) =
￿ exp(gL) to 0:99. We set the share of production employment accounted for by new prod-
ucts, the term 1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿f)exp(gz ￿ gN), to 0:063, which is the share of employment in new
establishments in the United States in 2007.18 With these numbers, ￿ = 1:16. As a ro-
bustness check, consider data from Broda and Weinstein (2010) on the sales share of newly
created consumer products obtained from ACNielsen￿ s Homescan database. They report a
sales share for newly created products of 9%, which leads to a value of ￿ = 1:1. Hence, this
scaling of ￿scal expenditures on policies a⁄ecting the subsidy to product innovation does not
substantially alter the relative ranking of the aggregate implications of the three policies that
we consider from the ranking one would obtain from directly comparing ￿scal expenditures.
On the basis of the data on ￿scal expenditures and our value of the parameter ￿, we
conclude that, to a ￿rst-order approximation, the long-term impact on aggregate output of
federal spending on R&D is substantially larger than the aggregate impact of the R&E Tax
Credit.
17The O¢ ce of Management and Budget (2009) provides an estimate for 2007 of the tax expenditures
arising from the fact that corporate R&D expenditures are expensed rather than counted as investment, at
$5 billion. This is a small portion of the revenue collected from the corporate pro￿ts tax. The portion of
these tax expenditures corresponding to product innovation must be even smaller.
18The source of this ￿gure is the 2007 Business Dynamics Statistics from the U.S. Small Business Admin-
istration. Employment in entering establishments is the sum of employment in new ￿rms (3:3%), as reported
in Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2010), and employment in new establishments by existing ￿rms (3%).
27To use our methodology to compare the aggregate impact of the R&E Tax Credit and
federal spending on R&D with the aggregate impact of the corporate pro￿ts tax, we must
divide the revenue currently collected from the corporate pro￿ts tax into a component that
corresponds to innovation policies ￿p, ￿g, and ￿e, and a component corresponding to a tax on
physical capital ￿k. As we have seen in Proposition 6, the impact of a tax on physical capital
on aggregate output per dollar of ￿scal revenue collected from that tax di⁄ers from the impact
of innovation policies on aggregate output per dollar of ￿scal spending on these policies,
depending on the model￿ s parameter values. Hence, we cannot make a direct comparison of
the impact of the corporate pro￿ts tax with the impact of the other innovation policies until
we choose parameter values for the model in the next section.
We ￿nd that, once we parameterize the model in the next section, the long-run impact
of the tax on the use of physical capital on aggregate output per dollar of ￿scal revenue
(given by expression 34) exceeds that of innovation policies (given by expression 33), unless
the spillover parameter ￿ is quite high (justifying an optimal uniform innovation subsidy
of roughly 30%). Therefore, given the large revenues collected from the corporate pro￿ts
tax in comparison with spending on the R&E Tax Credit and federal spending on R&D,
in our calibrated model the corporate pro￿ts tax has a signi￿cantly larger negative impact
on aggregate output in comparison with both the federal R&E Tax Credit and spending on
R&D￿ s positive impact on aggregate output, unless ￿ is very high. This result holds even if the
corporate pro￿ts tax is largely a tax on the use of physical capital. We thus conclude in our
calibrated model that the corporate pro￿ts tax is a relatively important policy (in comparison
with the R&E Tax Credit and federal expenditure on R&D) in terms of its aggregate e⁄ects
on the long-run accumulation of both tangible and intangible capital.
VIII. Quantitative Analysis on Aggregate E⁄ects of Changes in Policies
We now perform a calculation of the absolute (as opposed to relative) magnitude of the
aggregate impact of a change in innovation policy in a calibrated version of our model. We
consider, for simplicity, an economy that is on a BGP with subsidies and taxes set equal to
zero, and conduct several policy experiments. First, we ask what is the aggregate impact of a
uniform subsidy to innovative activities (￿g = ￿e) that on the new BGP has ￿scal expenditures
of 3% of GDP. For the U.S. economy, this ￿gure would have been approximately $420 bn
in 2007 (i.e., similar in magnitude to revenues collected from the corporate pro￿ts tax that
year). In our second and third experiments, we calculate the aggregate impact of a subsidy
to process innovation ￿g and a subsidy to the use of physical capital ￿￿k, respectively, that
on the new BGP have a ￿scal expenditure of 3% of GDP. We consider both the long-run
28response and the transition dynamics from one BGP to another.
A. Calibration
To conduct this exercise, we must choose the parameters of our model. Table 1 lists the
target moments and parameter values. A time period is de￿ned to be a year. We normalize
the level of population, L, at time zero to 1 and have it grow at rate gL = 0:01. We
normalize the level of scienti￿c knowledge, Ar, at time zero to 1 and set its growth rate, gA,
so that, given the other parameter choices, the growth rate of output per capita is 2%: We
normalize the cost of product innovation, ne, to 1. We parameterize the cost function for
process innovation, c(exp(gz)) = c0 [c1 + exp(gz)1+￿c]. Recall from expression (19) that the
parameter ￿c determines the response of process innovation by incumbent ￿rms to changes in
innovation policies. In our ￿rst and third experiments, the optimal choice of gz is not altered
by the change in policy, both on the BGP and on the transition path. Therefore, in these
two experiments, the choice of parameter ￿c does not a⁄ect our results. From Proposition 4,
we have that to a ￿rst-order approximation, the parameter ￿c does not a⁄ect the aggregate
e⁄ects in the BGP of a change in the subsidy to process innovation. To check the accuracy
of this result when the policy changes are large, we set ￿c = 10 so that the growth rate of
incumbent ￿rms increases by 1 percentage point for every 10 percentage point change in the
subsidy rate to process innovation.
We choose the parameters ￿, ￿k, ￿f, and ￿ as follows. The discount factor ￿ corre-
sponds to the ratio of the growth rate of per capita GDP to the interest rate (in terms of the
consumption good). We use a per capita growth rate of GDP of 2% and an interest rate of
4%, which implies ￿ = 0:98: We set the depreciation rate on physical capital to ￿k = 0:10: We
choose the exogenous exit rate of incumbent ￿rms to ￿f = 0:053; which corresponds to the
employment-weighted exit rate of U.S. establishments in 2007.19 We set the share of labor in
the production function of the research good to ￿ = 0:01. This choice is guided by the data
from the NIPA satellite accounts on the price of inputs into R&D. In our model, the ratio
of the relative price of research inputs to the price of ￿nal output is directly proportional to
W ￿. Given that in the data, the relative price of research inputs to the GDP de￿ ator shows
no trend, we set ￿ close to zero.
To calibrate the remaining parameters, we use as targets a standard share of labor in
GDP of 66% and a share of dividends to owners of ￿rms (payments to intangible capital)
19The source of this ￿gure is the 2007 Business Dynamics Statistics from the U.S. Small Business Admin-
istration. We include exit of all establishments, whether or not the ￿rm that owns the establishment actually
exits.
29in GDP of 1% (obtained from McGrattan and Prescott 2005b). We denote this share of
dividends by ￿ = (￿NZ ￿ PrYr)=GDP. The share of rental payments to physical capital in
GDP is calculated as a residual equal to 33%. The expressions for the factor shares presented
above together with ￿ = 0:01 imply ￿ = 1=3. We use as a target an innovation intensity
of the economy (share of intangible investment in GDP) of sr = 0:15 (this estimate is taken
from Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel 2009).






Our calibration of ￿ = 1:16 above implies sg = 0:54. We choose the parameters ￿, c0,
c1, gz, and gN to hit our target values of sr, sg, ￿, gY=L, and the employment share of new
products, using the equations described above. This procedure results in values of parameters
￿ = 7:15, gz = 0:07, and gN = 0:08.21 Note that, with ￿ close to zero, Lp=L is essentially one
and GDP=Y = 1=(1 + sr) = 0:86.
This calibration procedure does not pin down the choice of parameters ￿ and ￿r gov-
erning the spillover of the research good (that is, given our calibration procedure, the values
of all target and parameters other than gA of our calibration are independent of ￿ and ￿r).
Hence, the value of ￿ is not pinned down either. We report results below for a wide variety
of values of ￿ ranging from 0 to 0:74 (so that ￿ varies from ￿ = 0:75 when ￿ = 0, to ￿ = 0:07
when ￿ = 0:74), and set ￿r = 0:10. In our calibration, the optimal level of the subsidy to
innovative activity as a function of ￿, from equation (26), is ￿￿
g = ￿￿
e = 0:944 ￿ ￿. Hence,
the optimal innovation subsidy ranges from 0 to 0:7. We brie￿ y discuss the sensitivity of our
results to changes in ￿, ￿, and ￿r.
B. Long-Run Impact
We now use our calibrated model to assess the long-run impact of our three policy experi-
ments: a uniform subsidy to innovative activities (￿g = ￿e = 0:162), a subsidy to process
innovation (￿g = 0:221), and a subsidy on the use of physical capital (￿k = ￿0:084). In each
of these policy experiments, we start from a baseline of zero policies and assume that the
changes in subsidy rates are unanticipated and permanent, and result in ￿scal expenditures
of 3% of GDP in the BGP.
Figure 1 displays the log change in GDP from the initial BGP to the new BGP under
our three experiments. Recall that in our model, since the long-run growth rate is independent
20We obtain this expression from equation (28), the de￿nition of the research intensity of the economy as
sr together with the resource constraint for the research good (4), and the de￿nition of ￿:
21We do not report the values of c0 and c1 since they do not have any particular interpretation other than
resulting in the target gz and sg. We also note our calibration procedure results in a unique choice for all of
our parameters.
30of policy, GDP across BGPs di⁄ers by a ￿xed log di⁄erence at each date. This log di⁄erence
also corresponds to the long-run change in GDP when GDP is detrended by the exogenous
growth rate.
When ￿ = 0, the log change in GDP across BGPs is relatively small: 0:027 in Ex-
periment 1, 0:019 in Experiment 2, and 0:058 in Experiment 3. As ￿ gets large, the change
in GDP clearly becomes much larger. For example, when ￿ = 0:74 the log change in GDP
is 2:29 in Experiment 1 (so that GDP increases by a factor of exp(2:29) = 9:88), 2:11 in
Experiment 2, and 0:62 in Experiment 3. If ￿ is increased slightly further, so that ￿ is driven
closer to 0, our model becomes an endogenous growth model and this change in GDP across
BGPs rises toward in￿nity. Clearly, our model￿ s implications for the long-run impact of a
given change in policies vary tremendously depending on the assumed spillover parameter.22
The changes in aggregate consumption in each of these experiments are of similar magnitudes
to the changes in GDP shown in Figure 1.
Note that the changes in GDP corresponding to Experiments 1 and 2 are quite similar,
even though these two di⁄erent changes in innovation policies have very di⁄erent implications
for observed changes in ￿rm dynamics. In Experiment 1, there is no change in the process
innovation decisions of incumbent ￿rms, and hence the average productivity of incumbent
￿rms Z remains unchanged. The increases in GDP that occur arise due to increases in
product innovation and physical capital. On the other hand, in Experiment 2, investments
in process innovation by incumbent ￿rms grow considerably, raising the average growth rate
of incumbent ￿rms by roughly 1:5 percentage points. As a result, the average productivity of
incumbent ￿rms rises by a factor of 1:6. Of course, this change in the behavior of incumbent
￿rms does not have a signi￿cant impact on aggregate output because of the o⁄setting response
of product innovation.
Note also that the change in GDP corresponding to a change in a subsidy to the use of
physical capital in Experiment 3 is larger (smaller) than the changes in GDP corresponding
to a change in innovation subsidies in Experiments 1 and 2 when ￿ is below (above) roughly
0:3 (which is associated with an optimal innovation subsidy of ￿￿
g = ￿￿
e = 0:29). That is,
as we discussed above, in our calibration the impact of a change in the physical capital tax
22The ￿rst-order approximations of the change in GDP corresponding to a change in policies derived
in Section VI are quite accurate even for these relatively large changes in policies. In Experiment 1, the
approximation is within 10% of the exact answer for all values of ￿. The main error is coming from the
log-linear approximation of the equation GDP = Y ￿ X. In Experiment 2, the ￿rst-order approximation
is within 20% of the exact answer for all values of ￿. The approximation error is the result of higher order
terms from changes in the growth rate of incumbent ￿rms gz. In Experiment 3, the ￿rst-order approximation
is extremely accurate.
31per dollar of ￿scal expenditure is larger than the impact of innovation subsidies per dollar of
￿scal expenditure when ￿ is low.
The research intensity of the economy increases from sr = 0:15 on the initial BGP to
sr = 0:185 on the new BGP in Experiment 1 and to sr = 0:183 in Experiment 2, whereas
it remains unchanged in Experiment 3. As discussed in Section VI, these changes in the
research intensity of the economy across BGPs are independent of the spillover parameter ￿.
None of these results depend on the choice of ￿r.
We now ask what our model￿ s implications are for the behavior of aggregates during
the transition from the initial to the new BGP.
C. Transition Dynamics
To compute the transition dynamics from one BGP to another, we solve the model numeri-
cally. We report on the behavior of aggregates over the ￿rst 15 years of the transition path.
We focus on this 15-year horizon to show our model￿ s implications for aggregates over a hori-
zon that is relevant for applied work on the consequences of actual policy changes. In each
of these experiments, we are using the same change in subsidy rates as we described above.
We ￿nd that, in all of our experiments, in the 15th year of the transition, the ratio of ￿scal
expenditure on subsidies to GDP is always close to 3%.
Figure 2 displays the log change in detrended GDP 15 years after the policy change
for each of our three experiments, for the same range of values of ￿ used in Figure 1. In this
￿gure, we see that the range of responses of GDP over a 15-year horizon is much smaller than
the range of long-run responses shown in Figure 1. In particular, in contrast to Figure 1, in
all cases, the log change in detrended GDP is less than 0:05. These changes in detrended
GDP amount to changes in the average annual growth rate of GDP during the ￿rst 15 years
of transition of less than 1=3 of 1 percentage point. Hence, our model￿ s implications for the
impact of a given change in policies over a 15-year horizon do not vary so much with the
assumed spillover parameter ￿.23
In Figure 3, we plot the change (in percentage points) of the research intensity of the
economy, sr, 15 years after the policy change in each of our experiments. This change in the
research intensity is roughly the same as the long-run change across all the values of ￿ in our
three policy experiments.
Note that in the case of low spillovers, the change in GDP over the ￿rst 15 years
amounts to a large fraction of the long-run change in GDP across BGPs (e.g., 0:49 in Exper-
23The impact of a change in the subsidy to the use of physical capital over a 15-year horizon is larger than
the impact of a change in innovation subsidies for a wide range of spillover parameters ￿.
32iment 1 whereas ￿ = 0), whereas in the case of high spillovers, the change in GDP over the
￿rst 15 years is a small fraction of the long-run change in GDP (e.g., 0:02 in Experiment 1
when ￿ = 0:74). This di⁄erence in responses over di⁄erent horizons follows from the result
that the transition dynamics of our model get signi￿cantly slower as the spillover parameter
increases. For example, in Experiment 1, when ￿ = 0:74 it takes more than 250 years for the
cumulative change in GDP to reach half the long-run change (in contrast, when ￿ = 0, the
half-life is 16 years). If ￿ is increased slightly further, so that if ￿ is driven closer to 0, our
model becomes an endogenous growth model and the half-life approaches in￿nity.24
Consider now the impact of our policy changes on welfare when transition dynamics
are taken into account. In Figure 4 we show the overall welfare gains (de￿ned as the logarithm
of the equivalent variation in consumption), taking into account the whole transition for the
range of spillovers considered in Figures 1￿ 2 in each of our three policy experiments. As
this ￿gure shows, our model implies that the welfare gains from our policy experiments are
very small when there are no spillovers,25 and they are very large when the spillover is large
(e.g., in Experiment 1, when ￿ = 0:74, consumption in the initial BGP would have to be
permanently multiplied by exp(0:47) = 1:6 in order to provide the same level of utility as
that obtained in the transition after the policy change).
Thus, although the implications of our model for aggregates over a 15-year horizon
are not very sensitive to the assumed level of spillovers, the welfare implications of our model
are very sensitive to the choice of the spillover parameter. In Appendix B, we perform a
sensitivity analysis of our results with respect to changes in parameters ￿, ￿, and ￿r.
IX. What Do We Know about the Long-Run Impact of Innovation Policy?
With our calibrated model, we can answer the question of how permanent changes in inno-
vation policy a⁄ect the research intensity of the economy and the levels of GDP and other
aggregates over a 15-year horizon even if we do not have precise information about the strength
of spillovers from innovative activity. In particular, we found that a permanent subsidy to
innovative activities with a ￿scal impact of 3% of GDP per year raises the research intensity
of the economy by roughly 3 to 4 percentage points both in the long run and at a 15-year
24This slowdown of the transition dynamics as the spillover parameter increases is not likely to be an
artifact of our speci￿c calibration. For example, in a standard growth model extended to include spillovers to
the accumulation of physical capital, it is straightforward to show that there is a trade-o⁄ between the size
of the steady-state e⁄ects and the speed of transition from a policy change as the share of physical capital or
the strength of spillovers varies.
25If the subsidy on the production of the ￿nal good, ￿s, were optimally chosen to eliminate e⁄ective markups
(as opposed to being set at ￿s = 0) and ￿ = 0, then our policy changes would reduce welfare.
33horizon. This increase in research intensity is associated with an increase in GDP at a 15-year
horizon ranging between 1 and 5 percentage points for a wide range of possible values of the
spillover parameter ￿:
What we cannot answer is the question of how aggregate output and welfare respond
in the long run to a permanent policy change. We cannot answer this question because we do
not know how aggregate output responds in the long run to a policy-induced change in the
research intensity of the economy. From Propositions 3 and 4, we have that changes in the
aggregate research intensity driven by changes in three of our policies are related to aggregate














What we have shown is that the term in square brackets is highly sensitive to the strength
of spillovers, ￿, and the implied value of ￿.
Moreover, as we have seen above, our model implies very di⁄erent relationships be-
tween research intensity and aggregate output depending on the time horizon. This problem
is particularly severe when the spillovers are high. Given the slowdown in the transition
dynamics as the spillover parameter increases, we suspect it would be di¢ cult in practice
to use data on the response of GDP to a policy change over a 15-year horizon to infer the
degree of spillovers. This is because it would be di¢ cult in practice to tell the di⁄erence
between a 15-year cumulative, detrended, GDP change in the range of those shown in Figure
2. Using cumulative changes in GDP for shorter time horizons, these di⁄erences would be
even smaller. Hence, we are skeptical that one could uncover useful measures of the aggregate
long-run implications of a policy-induced change in the research intensity of the economy with
no more than one or two decades of data.
To conclude, our model establishes a benchmark for evaluating the theoretically pre-
dicted impacts of policy changes on ￿rm responses observed in micro data and the relationship
between those ￿rm-level responses and the responses of macroeconomic aggregates. To do
so, we have gained a great deal of tractability with a number of stark assumptions, such as a
common growth rate for all continuing ￿rms (Gibrat￿ s law), constant markups from CES de-
mand, constant factor shares from Cobb-Douglas production functions, symmetric spillovers
from both process and product innovation, and perhaps most importantly, completely elas-
tic product innovation. Further research is needed to assess the sensitivity of our results to
empirically plausible deviations from these strong assumptions.
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37Table 1: Model Calibration
Calibrated parameters Targets
Growth rate of population, gL 0.01 Growth rate of population = 0.01
Depreciation rate of physical capital, k 0.1 Depreciation rate of physical capital = 0.10
Curvature in the innovation cost function, c 10 Growth rate of incumbents rises 1% for every 10% increase in g
Growth rate of number of varieties, gN 0.082 Growth rate of per capita GDP = 0.02
Discount factor,  0.98 Difference between interest rate and growth rate = 0.01
Exit rate of incumbent firms, f 0.053 Employment-weighted exit rate of U.S. establishments in 2007
Share of labor in production function of research good,  0.01 Trend difference, U.S. price of inputs into R&D and GDP deflator
Share of physical capital,  1/3 Share of labor in GDP = 0.66
Elasticity of substitution across products,  7.15 Research intensity (share of intangible investment in GDP), sr = 0.15
Parameters in innovation cost function, c0 and c1 0.0147 and 0.0445 Share of dividends (payments to intangible capital) in GDP = 0.01
Share of production employment by new establishments = 0.063
     Imply ratio of process-innovation costs to variable profits, sg = 0.54,
     growth rate of z, gz = 0.07 , and 
Parameters governing spillover from cumulative innovative activity
Share,  0 to 0.74 Implies ranging between 0.76 (when and 0.07 (when = 0.74)
Depreciation rate, r 0.1 Sensitivity, r = 0.05 and r = 0.15
Other parameters that do not affect results
Population at time zero, L 1
Level of scientific knowledge at time 0, Ar 1
Cost of product innovation, n e 1
Policies
Taxes and subsidies on initial balanced growth path (BGP): j = 0 , j = p,s,g,e,k
Taxes and subsidies on new BGP: Fiscal expenditures = 3% of GDP on new BGP
     Experiment 1: g = e = 0.162 and j	= 0 , j = p,k,s
     Experiment 2: g = 0.221 and j	= 0 , j = p,e,k,s








Figure 1: GDP, log change across balanced growth paths
 
 














































Figure 4: Welfare (log of equivalent variation in consumption)Appendix A: Proofs
Derivation of BGP. We ￿rst provide additional details of the derivation of the BGP with
semi-endogenous growth and with product innovation. We ￿rst introduce two equations that
we use, which are implied from the factor shares presented above:







Rkt (1 + ￿k)
. (A2)
The growth rate of the measure of incumbent ￿rms gN is derived from equations (1), (4),
(6), (7), and (12). The growth rate of output of the consumption good (and hence con-
sumption, physical capital, and the input into innovative activity X) is given by gY =
gN=[(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)] + gL (from equations (1) and (12)), the growth rate of output of the
research good is given by gY r = gN (from equation (4)), the growth rate of the wage
is gY ￿ gL (from equation (A1)), and the rental rate of capital is constant and given by
Rk = ￿
￿1 exp(gY ￿ gL) ￿ 1 + ￿k from equations 1 + ￿ rt = Rkt+1 + 1 ￿ ￿k and






Finally, using (A3), (13), and (1+rt) = (1+￿ rt) Prt
Prt+1, the interest rate in terms of the research
good is given by r = ￿
￿1 exp(gN ￿ gL) ￿ 1.
To ensure that average productivity Z is ￿nite in a BGP, we must have that the
solution for the growth rate of incumbent ￿rms gz not be too large. Speci￿cally, we require
the restriction that
(1 ￿ ￿f)exp(gz) < exp(gN). (A4)
If condition (A4) is violated, the BGP does not have positive product innovation.
To ensure that a solution for ￿=Pr exists, we must have (1￿￿f)exp(gz) < 1+r, which
is satis￿ed due to (A4) and our assumption that ￿ exp(gL) < 1.
Equation (24) is obtained from (4), (15), and (22). Equation (25) is obtained from
(6), (7), (9), (12), (13), (14), (A1), and (A2), imposing that the spillover from cumulative






















In equation (25), the parameter ￿ determines to what extent an increase in total
productivity NZ crowds out ￿rm pro￿tability, taking into account all the general equilibrium
A-1e⁄ects on aggregate prices and quantities. These general equilibrium e⁄ects are as follows:
1. An increase in total productivity NZ of 1% increases output of the consumption good
Y by 1=[(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)]% (taking into account the direct e⁄ect on productivity and
the indirect e⁄ect through an increase in the capital stock), increasing the demand and
hence the pro￿tability of any individual ￿rm by the same percentage.
2. An increase in the total productivity NZ of 1% increases the wage by
1=[(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)]% and hence the marginal cost of production by 1=(￿ ￿ 1)%, reduc-
ing the pro￿tability of any individual ￿rm measured in units of the ￿nal consumption
good by 1%.
3. An increase in the total productivity NZ of 1% increases the wage by
1=[(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)]% and increases the spillover from cumulative innovative activity
on the BGP by (1 ￿ ￿)= [(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)]%. These two e⁄ects change the price
of the research good by (￿ ￿ ￿)=[(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)]%.
Adding these three e⁄ects gives a combined e⁄ect of negative ￿%. When ￿ > 0, the cumulative
e⁄ect of these three general equilibrium e⁄ects is negative, meaning that an increase in the
total productivity of incumbent ￿rms crowds out the pro￿tability of ￿rms and hence crowds
out the incentive for these ￿rms to continue to innovate. Without an exogenous fall in the
price of the research good brought about by exogenous scienti￿c progress and/or an exogenous
fall in wages brought about by an exogenous increase in population, productivity growth due
to innovation by ￿rms must cease in the long run.
BGP without Product Innovation. On a BGP without product innovation, exp(gN) =
1 ￿ ￿f and gN + gz is equal to the right-hand side of expression (21) ￿ at these growth
rates, condition (A4) is violated. The free-entry condition (11) does not apply. Instead, ￿rm
pro￿tability adjusts so that expression (17) holds at the speci￿ed level of gz. Once this level of
pro￿tability is obtained, aggregates are solved for by setting M = 0, taking Nt as determined
by initial conditions, and solving for the level of Zt and Lpt=Lrt using equations (24) and
(25), for given levels of At and Lt. This model can also have fully endogenous growth of the
form described below, if gA = gL = ￿ = 0.
BGP with Endogenous Growth. We now brie￿ y describe a BGP with fully endogenous
growth. To have a BGP with endogenous growth, we need ￿ = 0 and gA + gL = 0. In this
case, we lose the recursive structure that we use in the semi-endogenous case because we
lose equation (21). To solve for the BGP at a point in time, we must choose a value of Nt
and solve simultaneously for the rest of the variables using the remaining equations of the
A-2semi-endogenous growth case. Note that the level of Nt is not pinned down by the conditions
for a BGP. Instead, the equilibrium level of Nt must be determined along the transition path
from a given initial condition N0 (analogously to the level of capital in an AK model).
An alternative assumption for generating endogenous growth is to have ￿ = ￿ = 1
and gA = gL = 0. This is the case discussed in Acemoglu (2009), chapter 13, to distinguish
between semi-endogenous (￿ < 1) and endogenous (￿ = 1) growth. While we have assumed
￿ < 1, the case with ￿ = ￿ = 1 corresponds to the limit of cases subsumed in our analysis in
which ￿ and ￿ both converge to 1 along the path that keeps ￿ = 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. To prove this proposition, we guess and verify that the old alloca-
tion is an equilibrium allocation under the new policies. From equation (19) in an equilibrium
with positive product innovation, the growth rate of incumbent ￿rms gz is independent of
innovation policies as long as ￿g = ￿e. From equation (11), with rt = ~ rt, we must have




1￿￿g. Since ￿p, ￿g, and ￿e do not enter into any other equilibrium condition, our
conjecture is veri￿ed. Note that the equilibrium allocations between these two policies are
equal at every date, even away from the BGP. Q.E.D.












1￿￿ ￿ Xt + (1 ￿ ￿k)Kt ￿ Kt+1
Lt
!
subject to the two following per-period constraints:
￿t￿
tLt : Nt+1Zt+1 =
￿















tLt : Ht+1 = (1 ￿ ￿r)Ht + AtH
￿




with K0, N0Z0, and H0 given, and where ￿t and ￿t denote the Lagrange multipliers of each
constraint.
We ￿rst simplify the problem by showing that gzt is constant over time if there is
positive product innovation. To see this, the ￿rst-order condition (FOC) w.r.t. gzt is
￿t exp(gzt)
￿







A-3If there is positive product innovation, we must have ￿t > 0, so
ne = c
0 (exp(gz)): (A5)
To simplify notation in this proof, we de￿ne c = c(exp(gz)).







































Taking the ratio of these two expressions, we obtain
Xt =






















































0 = ￿￿t + ￿t+1￿ exp(gL)(1 ￿ ￿r) + ￿￿ exp(gL)
￿
































+ 1 ￿ ￿k
!
. (A10)
A-4We can further simplify (A9) using (A7):
￿￿t+￿t+1￿ exp(gL)(1 ￿ ￿r)+￿ exp(gL)













We now impose that we are in a BGP with (Nt+1Zt+1)=(NtZt) = Ht+1=Ht = exp(gN).
If ￿ > 0, the growth rate gN is equal to its level in the equilibrium, given by expression (21)
(we discuss the case when ￿ = 0 below). In the BGP, from (A7), ￿t and ￿t must each grow
at the same rate exp(g￿) given by
exp(g￿) = exp(gN)
￿￿1




where we used gK=L =
gN













where Rk = ￿
￿1 exp(gY ￿ gL)￿1+￿k as in the equilibrium. Combining (A8), (A11), (A12),




































[exp(gN) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿r)]
[exp(gN) ￿ ￿ exp(gL)(1 ￿ ￿r)]
.
In order to solve for Lpt=Lrt; we must solve for ￿t=￿t. Using (A7), (A8), and the law of motion































(1 ￿ ￿f)￿￿ exp(gL)
exp(gN)(1 ￿ ￿￿ exp(gL)) ￿ ￿ exp(gL)(1 ￿ ￿r)(1 ￿ ￿)























exp(gN)(1 ￿ ￿￿ exp(gL)) ￿ ￿ exp(gL)(1 ￿ ￿r)(1 ￿ ￿)
[exp(gN) ￿ ￿ exp(gL)(1 ￿ ￿r)]
￿
.
We now derive the equilibrium level of Lpt=Lrt assuming that ￿g = ￿e. Using (24), (29), and
two equations used in the proof of Proposition 6,
(1 ￿ ￿g)PrneM￿ = (1 + ￿p)￿NZ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿g)Prc(exp(gz))NZ,























We are now ready to calculate the policies such that the equilibrium allocations co-
incide with the optimal allocations in a BGP. To set equation (19) equal to (A5), we need
￿￿
g = ￿￿





= 1 ￿ ￿
￿ exp(gL)[exp(gN) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿r)]
[exp(gN) ￿ ￿ exp(gL)(1 ￿ ￿r)]
.
To set equation (A6) equal to (14), using the equilibrium wage expression,
Wt =






we need (1 + ￿￿
s) = ￿=(￿ ￿ 1). Finally, to set equation (A2) equal to (A12), we set ￿￿
k = 0.
Note that in the speci￿cation of our model with ￿ = 0, we cannot use (21) to solve for
gN. In this case, for any given policies, gN solves equations (11) and (23). The expressions
A-6for optimal policies are the same as those under ￿ > 0, but gN needs to be endogenously
determined.
Proof of Proposition 3. Result 1 is based on equations (11), (19), and (22). Re-
sult 2 is based on equation (23), together with the fact that aggregate growth rates and
the interest rate in the BGP are invariant to policy changes. Result 3 is based on equa-
tion (24), together with the fact that gz is unchanged. To calculate the log changes in
Lp and Lr individually, we use a ￿rst-order approximation of the labor market clearing
condition,
Lp
L ￿log(Lp=L) + Lr
L ￿log(Lr=L) = 0, and the log change in Lp=Lr, to obtain
￿log(Lp=L) = ￿(Lr=L)￿log(1 + ￿p) and ￿log(Lr=L) = (Lp=L)￿log(1 + ￿p): To calcu-
late the log change in NZ in result 4, we use equation (25). To calculate the log change in
GDP in result 5, we use two intermediate calculations. First, ￿logY = 1
(￿￿1)(1￿￿)￿logNZ+
￿logLp, where we are using equations (A1), (A2), and the fact that Rk is constant to
calculate the change in the physical capital stock, ￿logKt = ￿logYt. Second, to a ￿rst-
order approximation, ￿log Y ￿X






, where we are using that X is pro-
portional to WLr and that Y is proportional to WLp. Combining these two calculations,
￿logGDP = ￿logY +￿log Y ￿X
Y , we obtain result 5. To calculate the change in sr in result
6, we use (16). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. Result 1 is immediate from (11). In result 2, the change in gz
and Z is obtained by using a ￿rst-order approximation of equation (19) and equation (22),
respectively. In result 3, the change in ￿=Pr is obtained by using a ￿rst-order approximation
of (23),









(1 ￿ ￿g)c0 (exp(gz))
(1 + ￿p) ￿
Pr ￿ (1 ￿ ￿g)c(exp(gz))
￿
(1 ￿ ￿f)
1 + r ￿ (1 ￿ ￿f)exp(gz)
#
exp(gz)￿gz,
and noting that the term in square brackets is equal to zero from the ￿rst-order condition
(19) for gz, and equations (11) and (23). To obtain the change in Lp=Lr, we use a ￿rst-order










and note that the second term is zero from equation (19) and the fact that initial policies are
A-7set so that ￿g = ￿e (note that this is the only step in which we use the assumption ￿g = ￿e).
The remaining variables are calculated using the same steps as in the proof of Proposition
3. Note that if ￿log(1 ￿ ￿g) = ￿log(1 ￿ ￿e), Proposition 4 is equivalent to Corollary 1.
Q.E.D.
Corollary to Proposition 4: If our model has a BGP with semi-endogenous growth and
positive product innovation, and policies are initially set so that ￿g = ￿e, then a change in
the subsidy to process innovation of size ￿log(1 ￿ ￿g) and/or a change in the subsidy to
product innovation of size ￿log(1 ￿ ￿e) results in the same changes in the constant in ￿rm
pro￿ts, ￿=Pr, the aggregate allocation of labor between production and research, Lp=Lr, the
index of total productivity, NZ, aggregate output, GDP, and the research intensity of the
economy, sr, to a ￿rst-order approximation, as a change in the subsidy to variable pro￿ts of
size ￿log(1 + ￿p) = ￿[sg￿log(1 ￿ ￿g) + (1 ￿ sg)￿log(1 ￿ ￿e)].
Proof: This follows immediately from Propositions 2 and 4. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. Result 1 is immediate from (11). In result 2, the change in gz
and Z is obtained by using a ￿rst-order approximation of equation (19) and equation (22),
respectively. In result 3, the change in ￿=Pr is obtained by using a ￿rst-order approximation
of (23),









(1 ￿ ￿g)c0 (exp(gz))
(1 + ￿p) ￿
Pr ￿ (1 ￿ ￿g)c(exp(gz))
￿
(1 ￿ ￿f)
1 + r ￿ (1 ￿ ￿f)exp(gz)
#
exp(gz)￿gz,
and noting that the term in square brackets is equal to zero from the ￿rst-order condition
(19) for gz, and equations (11) and (23). To obtain the change in Lp=Lr, we use a ￿rst-order










and note that the second term is zero from equation (19) and the fact that initial policies are
set so that ￿g = ￿e (note that this is the only step in which we use the assumption ￿g = ￿e).
The remaining variables are calculated using the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 3.
Q.E.D.
The change in ￿=Pr in equation (31) follows immediately from Propositions 3, 4, and
A-85, and the corollary to Proposition 4. The change in E, starting at ￿p = ￿g = ￿e, is












Equation (32) is obtained from the de￿nition of sg and expression (28) with ￿p = ￿g = ￿e.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. Result 1 is derived in the same way as in the proof of Proposition
3. Result 2 that Lp=Lr and sr are unchanged is obtained from (24) combined with the
fact that ￿=Pr is constant. The change in GDP in result 3 is derived by ￿rst calculating
￿logY using the log-linear approximation of equations (12) and (25) together with the
expression ￿logK = ￿logY ￿￿log(1 + ￿k) from expressions (A1) and (A2). We then have





, where ￿log Y ￿X
Y = 0 because Lp=Lr is constant. Q.E.D.
Aggregate E⁄ects of Changes in Policies with Endogenous Growth. As we have
discussed, with ￿ = 0; our model has a BGP with fully endogenous growth. Our simple
two-step algorithm for computing the impact of a change in policy no longer applies because
the BGP aggregate growth rates change with policies. One can show, however, that the
change in the BGP growth rate gN induced by a change in subsidies to process or product
innovation individually does not depend, to a ￿rst-order approximation, on the responsiveness
of ￿rms￿investments in process innovation as determined by ￿c. Moreover, to a ￿rst-order
approximation, changes in the subsidy to process or product innovation individually have
the same impact on the BGP growth rates as a change in the subsidy to variable pro￿ts as
long as these policy changes have the same impact on ￿rm pro￿tability, holding ￿xed ￿rms￿
process innovation decisions.
Aggregate Implications of Eliminating an Innovation Policy. Consider an economy
in which all of the existing policies taken together imply innovation policies ￿p, ￿g, and ￿e
(with ￿g = ￿e). Consider eliminating a speci￿c real-world policy i that is a combination of
three abstract innovation policies ￿i
p, ￿i
g, and ￿i
e but that does not involve ￿k or ￿s (note
that we are not assuming that ￿k and ￿s are equal to zero, but that they are not part of
the real-world policy under consideration). The elimination of this policy i results in new
innovation policies ￿p ￿ ￿i
p, ￿g ￿ ￿i
g, and ￿e ￿ ￿i
e.









Using an approximation that the change in ￿ arising from eliminating real-world policy i is
￿log(1 + ￿) = ￿i￿0
1+￿ for small ￿i, the expenditure on this real-world policy is approximately
E
i = (1 + ￿p)￿NZ
￿






Recall that, according to our corollary above, if initially ￿g = ￿e, then the change in aggregate




= ￿log(1 + ￿p) + sg￿log(1 ￿ ￿g) + (1 ￿ sg)￿log(1 ￿ ￿e).
Hence, the aggregate impact of eliminating a real-world innovation policy is directly propor-
tional (with the adjustment for ￿) to the current expenditure on that policy.
Appendix B: Sensitivity Analysis of Quantitative Results
We ￿rst consider the sensitivity of our results with respect to the parameter ￿, indexing the
share of research labor in the production of research goods. As discussed above, one common
assumption for generating endogenous growth is to set ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 1. Here we examine
the response of GDP in the long run and in transition in our model calibrated with ￿ = 1
and a range of values of ￿ from 0 to 0:95. We recalibrate the other parameters to match our
other targets. Note that when ￿ = 1, the parameter ￿ = 1 for all values of ￿ < 1. We ￿nd
again in this case that the long-run response of GDP varies tremendously with ￿, with a log
change in GDP of essentially 0 when ￿ = 0 to a log change in GDP of 0:76 when ￿ = 0:9.
The welfare gains also vary considerably with ￿, becoming quite large as ￿ gets close to 1.
Once again, however, the response of GDP over a 15-year horizon does not di⁄er much with
￿, ranging from essentially 0 when ￿ = 0 to 0:03 log points when ￿ = 0:95.
We next consider the sensitivity of our results to the parameter ￿ governing the elas-
ticity of substitution across products. In our calibration, ￿ = 7:15. This relatively high value
of ￿ corresponds to our target for the research intensity of the economy of roughly sr = 0:15.
We now consider a value of ￿ = 4, which, after recalibrating our model to match the other
targets, results in a research intensity of the economy of sr = 0:32. We choose values of ￿
ranging from 0 (so that ￿ = 0:51) to 0:45 (so that ￿ = 0:1). In the long run, the response of
A-10log GDP ranges from 0:057 when ￿ = 0 to 0:77 when ￿ = 0:45. The response of log GDP
over a 15-year horizon varies substantially less, from 0:034 when ￿ = 0 to 0:066 log points
when ￿ = 0:45.
Finally, we consider the sensitivity of our results to the parameter ￿r governing the
speed with which the spillover from accumulated innovation experience decays. Note ￿rst
that the long-run changes in aggregates do not depend on this parameter. In contrast, this
parameter does a⁄ect the model￿ s transition dynamics in the standard manner: the higher
is the depreciation parameter ￿r, the faster is the transition to the new BGP (and hence,
the larger is the change in GDP in the ￿rst 15 years of the transition). This e⁄ect on the
speed of transition is larger, the higher is ￿. We ￿nd, however, that this e⁄ect is not very
large quantitatively. For example, when ￿ = 0:7 (so that ￿ = 0:195), increasing ￿r from our
baseline value of 0:1 to 0:5 (so that half of accumulated experience with innovation is lost
every year) raises the cumulative change in log GDP in the ￿rst 15 years from 0:043 to 0:082,
which is still a small portion of the long-run change in log GDP of 0:705.
We conclude that, while the parameters ￿, ￿, and ￿r a⁄ect the absolute magnitude
of the response of GDP, the ￿nding that the response of GDP to a 15-year horizon is not
particularly sensitive to the parameter ￿ is robust to our choices of these parameters.
Appendix C: Quality Ladders Model. In this appendix, we describe a discrete time
quality ladders model with Schumpeterian innovation by both entering and incumbent ￿rms
similar to the model of ￿rm dynamics in Klette and Kortum (2004). In this model, there is a
￿xed set of products that can be improved through innovation by ￿rms. Firms di⁄er by the
number of products that they currently produce. This state variable indexes both the size
of an incumbent ￿rm and that ￿rm￿ s capacity for innovation. Entering and incumbent ￿rms
compete to capture products produced by other ￿rms by overtaking the incumbent producer
of these products through innovation. Firms￿innovative e⁄ort is not directed to particular
products but instead is matched randomly to products through a matching function that
captures possible congestion externalities in innovative activity. In contrast to our baseline
model, the spillover from innovative activity comes not from cumulative experience from
innovation, but instead from cumulative success with innovation as measured by the average
quality or productivity of the incumbent ￿rms￿￿xed set of products. In contrast with Klette
and Kortum, who set parameters at the knife-edge condition required for endogenous growth,
we allow for both fully and semi-endogenous growth. In this appendix, we show that our main
theoretical results apply equally well to this model.
As before, there are two ￿nal goods, a consumption and a research good, and a con-
A-11tinuum of mass one of products (intermediate goods) so Nt = 1. Associated with each
intermediate good is a frontier technology for producing that good indexed by z, and the
production function is given by (3). As before, we let Jt (z) denote the distribution of these
frontier technologies across products. Production of the ￿nal good is given by (2), which can
be expressed in the same manner as in our baseline model by (12), where Zt is de￿ned as
before as the average productivity of the frontier technologies. Since the number of products
is ￿xed, Zt also denotes total productivity.








with ￿ < 1. With this speci￿cation, the resource cost of innovating on the frontier technology
for producing a good rises one for one Zt when ￿ = 0 and in the limit as ￿ approaches 1,
becomes independent of Zt. Hence, we interpret ￿ as indexing the extent to which previous
innovation embodied in Z spills over to reduce the cost of further innovation. This spillover
will be external to any particular ￿rm because it depends on the average frontier technology
across all products. Standard speci￿cations of quality ladders models with fully endogenous
growth correspond to the case with 100% spillovers (￿ = 1) and ￿ = 1. We show below
that, just as in our baseline model, this is one set of parameter assumptions that generates
endogenous growth. An alternative assumption with incomplete spillovers (￿ < 1) and ￿ = 0
also generates endogenous growth.
The market structure is as follows. For each product, the frontier technology is owned
by an incumbent ￿rm, with exclusive rights to use that technology in production. That
￿rm sells the product at a constant markup over marginal cost. As is standard in quality
ladder models, this markup is the minimum of the monopoly markup, ￿=(￿ ￿ 1), and the gap
between the marginal cost of production using the frontier technology and the marginal cost
associated with previous frontier technology for that product, which we denote by ￿ > 1.
Below, we assume that the innovation step size ￿ is constant, and hence markups are constant





. Hence, variable pro￿ts associated with producing any given product
with frontier technology z are given by (1 + ￿p)￿exp(z), where ￿ is given by (9) with
constant ￿0 adjusted suitably for the markup.26 Calculations of income shares gives that
￿tNtZt =
￿￿1
￿ (1 + ￿s)Yt, WtLpt =
(1￿￿)
￿ (1 + ￿s)Yt, and hence WtLpt =
(1￿￿)
(￿￿1)￿tNtZt.
26In particular, ￿0 = ￿￿￿(￿ ￿ 1)
h




A-12Incumbent ￿rms are indexed by the products for which they own the frontier tech-
nologies. Hence, the state variable that characterizes an incumbent ￿rm is a vector of pro-
ductivities z of length n, where n denotes the number of products owned by this ￿rm. Let
Gt (n) denote the measure of incumbent ￿rms with n products at time t. The requirement
that each product be owned by some ￿rm implies
P1
n=1 nGt(n) = 1 for all periods t.
Through the innovation of other ￿rms, an incumbent ￿rm faces a probability ￿ft that
it loses the frontier technology of any of its n products. This probability is independent of z
and independent across products. Then, for a ￿rm with n products, the probability that it








Note that the expectation of this distribution is n￿ft. Adding up across ￿rms gives that
the measure of products that switch ownership between any two consecutive periods is given
by ￿ft
P1
n=1 nGt(n) = ￿ft. For standard reasons, in a quality ladders model the owner of a
product does not innovate on that product. Hence, the discounted present value of pro￿ts of
owning a product with productivity index z is described by the Bellman equation
Vt exp(z) = (1 + ￿p)￿t exp(z) +
(1 ￿ ￿ft)
1 + ￿ rt
Vt+1 exp(z).
Note that, in contrast to our baseline model, z does not change over time.
Both incumbent ￿rms and entering ￿rms innovate to improve upon the technology
frontier of a product. A ￿rm that succeeds in innovating on a product raises the frontier from
z to z+￿ and becomes the sole producer of the product. We assume that these ￿rms use the
research good to engage in research e⁄ort and that matching of research e⁄ort to innovation
on speci￿c products is done through random search with a matching function. We will show
below that it is optimal for every ￿rm to engage in the same research e⁄ort per product it
owns, independent of the level of z associated with those products. We impose this result
here to simplify the notation. Let each ￿rm of size n invest a total of nqt units of research
e⁄ort into trying to obtain new products, and let each entering ￿rm invest a total of one unit
of research e⁄ort into trying to obtain new products. Let Mt be the measure of entrants. The




nGt(n) + Mt = qt + Mt.
A-13Given this research e⁄ort, ￿rms are matched at random to successful innovations through a
matching function. The total measure of products innovated on is
￿ft = m(1;qt + Mt),
where the ￿rst argument denotes the measure of products available to be innovated upon and
the second argument denotes the total research e⁄ort. The function m is constant returns to
scale and increasing and concave in each argument.
These innovations are divided up at random among incumbent and entrant ￿rms. An















Note that the expectation of this distribution is ￿tn. Hence, the total measure of products
gained by incumbents of size n is ￿tnGt(n). Hence, summing over n gives that the total
measure of products gained by incumbents is ￿t. Note that, by construction, the total measure
of products innovated upon by incumbents plus those innovated upon by entrants is equal to
￿ft:
￿t + ￿tMt = ￿ft.




= ￿ft￿ + (1 ￿ ￿ft). (A18)
From here on, we will not track the size distribution of ￿rms, Gt (n). One can do so recognizing
that ￿rms gain products according to a Poisson distribution and lose them according to a
binomial distribution.
A-14Incumbent and entering ￿rms must use the research good to exert research e⁄ort. As
in Klette and Kortum (2004), the cost to incumbent ￿rms of engaging in research e⁄ort falls
with the number of products that they own. In particular, a ￿rm with n products must spend
~ c(qn;n) units of the research good to engage in qn units of research e⁄ort. We assume that
~ c(:::) is constant returns to scale, so we can rewrite this total cost as nc(q), where c(:) is
increasing and convex. Entering ￿rms must spend ne units of the research good to engage
in one unit of research e⁄ort. Summing across ￿rms, using the fact that
P
n=1 nGt(n) = 1,
gives the resource constraint for the research good,
c(qt) + neMt = Yrt.
Firm value in this model is very complicated because it depends on the vector of levels
of z for the n products owned by the ￿rm. All that matters for the choice of innovation by an
incumbent ￿rm, however, is the expected value of the pro￿ts associated with products that
it may win. Since the realizations of the number of products it will win and lose each period
are all independent, the computation of the expected returns to research e⁄ort is relatively
simple.
As we have discussed above, the expected discounted present value of variable pro￿ts
associated with a randomly chosen innovation gained at time t+1 is Vt+1Zt￿. The ￿rm also
gains value from increasing its number of products because that innovative success lowers
the cost of further innovation. We denote by Ut (n) the expected present value of pro￿ts
associated with innovative capacity indexed by n. One can show that this value function can
be written as Utn, where Ut is determined by the Bellman equation
Ut = max
~ q
￿(1 ￿ ￿g)c(~ q)Prt +
1














The ￿rst term on the right side indicates the cost if exerting q units of research e⁄ort per
product. The second term indicates the discounted present value of variable pro￿ts the ￿rm
expects to gain from the innovations that result from this research e⁄ort. The third term
denotes the expected value of the ￿rm￿ s innovative capacity from next period on, taking into
account both the gain in products it expects to obtain from its research e⁄ort (i.e., a ￿rm
with n products expects to gain ￿n =
~ q
q+M￿fn products) and the loss of products it expects
as a result of research e⁄ort from other ￿rms (i.e., a ￿rm with n products expects to lose ￿fn
A-15products). Note that each ￿rm takes as given the innovative e⁄ort of other ￿rms, as given by
qt, Mt, and ￿ft.










If the equilibrium has entering ￿rms, then the zero-pro￿t condition for entry implies
(1 ￿ ￿e)Prtne =
￿
1





Hence, just as in our baseline model, we have that in an equilibrium with entering ￿rms,
(1 ￿ ￿g)c
0(~ qt) = (1 ￿ ￿e)ne. (A19)
Characterizing a BGP with positive entry
On a BGP, the variables q, M, ￿f, ￿, ￿, Yr (the latter, following from the resource
constraint for the research good), ￿Z=Pr, V Z=Pr, Ut=Pr, and ￿ r are all constant over time.
The production functions for the ￿nal consumption good and the research good together
imply that the growth rate of average productivity is given by gZ = 1
￿(1￿￿)(gA +gL), where ￿
is de￿ned in the same manner as in the baseline model. Output per capita therefore grows
at the same rate as in our baseline model (but it is driven by growth in average productivity
rather than by growth in the number of products). The same parameter value assumptions
are required to di⁄erentiate between semi-endogenous and fully endogenous growth. The
rate at which innovations occur, ￿f, is pinned down from (A18). The matching function then
pins down q + M. Equation (A19) determines q and hence also M. Note that, in the BGP,
policies a⁄ect the division of innovative e⁄ort between incumbents and entering ￿rms, but
not the total research e⁄ort. In contrast to our baseline model, total and average productivity
here are both equal to Z, so there can be no o⁄set between average productivity and entry.
Instead, the o⁄set occurs between the innovative e⁄ort of incumbent ￿rms, q, and that of
entrants.
As in our baseline model, we can use the ￿rm￿ s Bellman equations to obtain the BGP
level of pro￿tability ￿Z=Pr. Manipulating the Bellman equations gives
(1 ￿ ￿e)ne =
￿
r + ￿f ￿ ￿
￿
￿g (1 + ￿p)￿Z=Pr ￿ (1 ￿ ￿g)c(q)
￿
; (A20)







Finally, we use the macroeconomic structure of the model to determine the BGP levels
of Zt and Lpt=Lrt for a given level of ￿Z=Pr. To do so, we use the following two equations:
￿Z
Pr
= ￿1 (1 + ￿s)
1￿￿








(￿ ￿ 1)￿[c(q) + neM]
, (A22)
where ￿1 is adjusted suitably relative to our baseline model.27 These equations are slightly
di⁄erent from (24) and (25) in our baseline model due to the markup ￿ (which can di⁄er
from ￿=(￿ ￿ 1) in our baseline model) and due to the di⁄erence in the way we modeled the
spillovers in the production of the research good. It is still the case, however, that the value
of ￿ plays a key role in determining how productivity Z moves in response to changes in
pro￿tability. Finally, the research intensity of the economy, sr = PrYr=(Y ￿ X); is given by
expression (16) in our baseline model with ￿ substituting ￿=(￿ ￿ 1).
Aggregate implications of changes in policies
We can use equations (A20), (A21), and (A22) to reproduce the results in our baseline
model. The results in Proposition 1 follow immediately from (A20). The optimal innovation
subsidy, which can be solved by following steps similar to those in Proposition 2, di⁄ers
slightly from that in expression (26) because of the slightly di⁄erent form of spillovers in
both models.
Propositions 3, 4, and the corollary to Proposition 4 are unchanged except that the
term sg must be adjusted to take into account the di⁄erent time pro￿le of the pro￿ts associated
with successful innovations. In particular, the change (to a ￿rst-order approximation) in
pro￿tability, ￿Z=Pr, in response to changes in innovation policies ￿p, ￿g, and ￿e is given by
￿log(￿Z=Pr) = ￿￿log(1 + ￿p) +
sg
￿g







27In particular, ￿1 = ￿0￿















(1+￿p)￿Z as in our baseline model. For a given change in ￿Z=Pr, the changes
in aggregate output, the aggregate allocation of labor, and the research intensity of the
economy are the same as those in our baseline model. The change in the innovation intensity





[￿log(1 ￿ ￿e) ￿ ￿log(1 ￿ ￿g)].
The change in aggregate ￿scal expenditures, E, in response to changes in innovation
policies (starting with ￿p = ￿g = ￿e = 0) is given by
￿E = ￿Z
￿








r + ￿f ￿ ￿
￿f ￿ ￿
> 1,
where we used equation (A20) reexpressed as
(1 ￿ ￿e)nePrM￿ =
￿
￿g (1 + ￿p)￿Z ￿ (1 ￿ ￿g)c(q)Pr
￿
:
The relation between the change in aggregate ￿scal expenditures and the change in prof-
itability (and hence other aggregates) is a⁄ected by the time pro￿les of the pro￿ts associated
with a successful innovation and the innovation investments of an incumbent ￿rm. Note,
however, that as r ! 0 (which is the case as ￿ exp(gL) ! 1, so that the growth of aggregate
GDP approaches the consumption interest rate), then ￿g ! 1 and ￿ ! 1. In this case, the
aggregate impact of changes in innovation policies is directly proportional to the ￿scal impact
of these changes, as in our baseline model. Finally, the aggregate implications of changes in
the tax to the use of physical capital (Proposition 6) are equal to those in our baseline model.
A-18